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This paper develops a transaction cost economic model for regulation and
applies the model to environmental siting regulations designed to overcome
NIMBY ("Not In My Back Yard') political opposition. Negotiations between
developers and resistant local communities to site waste facilities, such as
landfills or solid waste incinerators, can be characterized as a contracting
problem. A rudimentary application of the Coase theorem suggests that
developers should be able to compensate communities adequately for hosting a
waste facility, but rarely do such negotiations find success. Transaction costs
associated with the requisite negotiations, communication, and implementation
of the projects preclude efficient bargaining, and thus NIMBY opposition halts
the siting of socially necessary and beneficial facilities. Viewing NIMBY
disputes as a contracting problem within the world ofpositive transaction costs
therefore reveals the dynamics that foil negotiations between developers and
communities. Such a perspective also identifies the role that the theory of the
firm can play in understanding how siting regulations overcome those
transaction costs and how regulatory regimes can be optimally designed for
siting alternative facilities.
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Introduction
A leading economist recently observed, "the theory of the firm has
become a big business [and] one of the most fertile fields in the profession."'
Theories of the firm certainly have come a long way. Ronald Coase gave birth
to the field when in 1937 he observed that firms and markets "are alternative
methods of co-ordinating production" and then posed the seminal make-or-buy
paradigm: "The question which arises is whether it is possible to study the
forces which determine the size of the firm. Why does the entrepreneur not
organise one less transaction or one more?
' 2
I Robert Gibbons, Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm I (MIT Dep't of Econ., Working
Paper No. 04-34, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=596864.
2 R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388, 393-94 (1937).
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The theory of the firm has since branched out dramatically. While early
scholarship first responded directly to Coase's make-or-buy question and
developed formal theories to understand the size and parameters of firms, 3
recent scholarship has extended make-or-buy theories to explore innovative
research questions that do not involve the parameters of the firm. Such ventures
have included examining the privatization of government functions,4 the
organization of government agencies to attract private investment, 5 and the
organization of legislatures and political bodies to facilitate political
agreements and compromises.6 Consequently, the theory of the firm has begun
to explain far more than just the firm.
This Article moves that venture onward by employing the theory of the
firm, specifically transaction cost economics , to understand the NIMBY ("Not
In My Back Yard") problem, one of the most important and most vexing policy
3 Early leaders in the theory of the firm developed transaction cost economics. See OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975);
Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting
Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978); Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production:
Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 112 (1971); Oliver E.
Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON.
233 (1979). A property rights theory of the firm then developed in the 1980s, see Sanford J. Grossman
& Oliver D. Hart, The Costs of and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,
94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98
J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990). And new theories of the firm continue to emerge, see, e.g., Raghuram G.
Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origins and Growth of
Firms, 116 Q.J. ECON. 805 (2001) (articulating a theory of economic organization resting on dedicated
hierarchies).
4 See, e.g., Oliver Hart et al., The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to
Prisons, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1127 (1997) (using a property rights theory of the firm, with an emphasis on
incomplete contract theory and residual control rights, to evaluate the privatization of government
services); J. Bradford Jensen & Geoffrey S. Rothwell, Transaction Costs, Regulation, and
Subcontracting at Nuclear Power Plants, 36 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 369 (1998) (using transaction cost
economics to explain government privatization). See generally Andrei Shleifer, State Versus Private
Ownership, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 133 (1998).
5 See, e.g., Witold J. Henisz & Bennet A. Zelner, The Institutional Environment for
Telecommunications Investment, 10 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 123 (2001) (relating public utility
investments to political institutional design); Brian Levy & Pablo T. Spiller, The Institutional
Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation,
10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 201 (1994) (describing features of public institutions that attract private
investment); Pablo Spiller & Ingo Vogelsang, The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment
in the UK: The Case of Telecommunications, 153 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 607 (1997)
(suggesting that a prerequisite for private investment is a government's ability to credibly commit not to
pursue arbitrary administrative actions).
6 See, e.g., Philip Jones & John Hudson, The Role of Political Parties: An Analysis Based on
Transaction Costs, 94 PUB. CHOICE 175, 181-88 (1998) (describing political parties as solutions to
political market failures); Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public
Bureaucracy, in ORGANIZATION THEORY: FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO THE PRESENT AND BEYOND
116 (Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1990) (describing the institutional attributes of alternative policy
instruments); Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or,
Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132 (1988) (explaining
that legislative institutions support political exchange by enabling actors to commit credibly).
7 For a comprehensive overview of transaction cost economics, including both the early
applications to the parameters of the firm and the broader subsequent applications, see OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE (1996).
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challenges in the United States. 8 The NIMBY syndrome, which arises with any
effort to site locally undesirable but socially beneficial facilities, has stymied
policy makers, local land use planners, and developers for generations. Because
projects such as homeless shelters, prisons, airports, and waste disposal sites
typically impose concentrated and localized costs while creating widely
dispersed benefits, these facilities have often provoked intense resistance from
local residents. Though the NIMBY problem has proven to be particularly
intractable in the United States and Canada, it is a conflict endemic to all
democracies-and to any system of government that permits localities to
express and exert political opposition.
9
Since the mid-1970s, however, the NIMBY problem in the United States
has become more than a common nuisance, as certain facilities thought to be
essential have become nearly impossible to site due to organized and persistent
public opposition.'0 Some noteworthy illustrations include the growing
inability to site hazardous waste disposal facilities in the United States, the all
but abandoning of nuclear power by U.S. utility companies, and the
Department of Energy's persistent difficulties in selecting a permanent site for
high-level radioactive waste." For solid and hazardous waste facilities, the
siting problem has become so acute that some scholars have suggested that the
"NIMBY" syndrome is perhaps better characterized as "BANANA"-"Build
Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anything."' 2
In an effort to counteract the growing success of local opposition and
likewise to facilitate the building of locally undesirable but socially beneficial
8 See KENT E. PORTNEY, SITING HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT FACILITIES 10 (1991)
("Public opposition to facility siting has now reached the point where it has been given status as a full-
scale public malady-the NIMBY, or Not-in-my-backyard, Syndrome.").
9 See Don Munton, Introduction: The NIMBYPhenomenon and Approaches to Facility Siting,
in HAZARDOUS WASTE SITING AND DEMOCRATIC CHOICE 1, 9-10 (Don Munton ed., 1996).
10 See BARRY G. RABE, BEYOND NIMBY: HAZARDOUS WASTE SITING IN CANADA AND THE
UNITED STATES 28 (1994) ("The dominant approaches to hazardous waste facility siting in Canada and
the United States have given communities and individuals little reason to do anything other than attempt
to block facilities once they have been proposed.").
11 Linda Cohen et al., The Politics of Nuclear Power in Japan and the United States, in
STRUCTURE AND POLICY IN JAPAN AND IN THE UNITED STATES 177 (Peter Cowhey & Matthew D.
McCubbins eds., 1995); Joseph DiMento & LeRoy Graymer, Introduction: LULU, Governance, and
Regionalism: The Themes of the Volume, in CONFRONTING REGIONAL CHALLENGES: APPROACHES TO
LULUS, GROWTH, AND OTHER VEXING GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS 1 (Joseph DiMento & LeRoy
Graymer eds., 1991).
12 See MICHAEL O'HARE ET AL., FACILITY SITING AND PUBLIC OPPOSITION (1983); DiMento
& Graymer, supra note 11; see also RABE, supra note 10, at I ("No nation spends as much money per
capita, generates as much political anguish, or accomplishes less in implementing its hazardous waste
policies than does the United States."). "BANANA" is a term purported to have originated during the
intense NIMBY disputes of the early 1990s, see, e.g., The Word Spy, BANANA,
http://www.wordspy.com/words/BANANA.asp (last updated Sept. 9, 2003) (defining the term
"BANANA"), but is currently used to portray a general policy impasse, see, e.g., PETER HALL &
ULRICH PFEIFFER, URBAN FUTURE 21: A GLOBAL AGENDA FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CITIES 297
(2000) (describing BANANA as an "urban paralysis").
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facilities, states across the country have enacted numerous siting regulations.' 3
The specific nature of these reforms varies widely, ranging from relatively
simple efforts to improve information exchange between developers and
prospective host communities to more interventionist measures that give state
officials the power to assume control over the siting of controversial facilities.
However, many states have shunned facilitative measures in favor of more
forceful interventions that steamroll local opposition and endow a developer
with the forceful backing of a state power. 14 These states have in place siting
procedures that overcome NIMBY problems by removing siting processes from
the political arena altogether.'
5
Most academic observers have been largely sympathetic to policymakers
who seek forceful measures to counteract NIMBY opposition, 16 and academic
debate over the efficacy of these regulations has focused primarily on the
wisdom of where NIMBY facilities are ultimately sited.17 This predominant
view states that NIMBY opposition, albeit understandable, is simply in conflict
with the larger public interest and thus should not deter the siting of a facility.'
8
A second cadre of academics has advocated a regulatory process that
encourages community participation and the negotiation of compensation
schemes.19 These scholars believe that the NIMBY challenge can be overcome,
and community opposition can be pacified by finding the right price to pay
nearby residents. Though both of these approaches have appeal, neither has
achieved an admirable record of success.20 This failure is, in part, because few
13 See generally William B. Johnson, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
State Hazardous Waste Regulations, 86 A.L.R. 4th 401 (1991) (discussing regulations "to the extent that
they are reflected in ... reported cases").
14 See PORTNEY, supra note 8, at 8-10 (noting that several states have instituted either "pre-
emptive" regulations, whereby a state agency can override local opposition, or "local input" regulations,
which like preemptive regulations can override local opposition, but under which siting decisions are
guided by statewide boards that include local officials).
15 Id.
16 See Orlando E. Delogu et al., Some Model Amendments to Maine (and Other States') Land
Use Control Legislation, 56 ME. L. REv. 323, 345-46 (2004).
17 See, e.g., Patrick O'Hara, The N.LMB.Y Syndrome Meets the Preemption Doctrine:
Federal Preemption of State and Local Restrictions on the Siting of Hazardous Waste Disposal
Facilities, 53 LA. L. REv. 229, 231-32 (1992).
18 See, e.g., Daniel Mazmanian & David Morrell, The "NIMBY" Syndrome: Facility Siting
and the Failure of Democratic Discourse, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990's: TOWARD A NEW
AGENDA 125, 125-26 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 1990); Patricia Suter, The Siting System:
Theory and Reality, I ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 24, 24 (1995).
19 See infra notes 57-59, 69-76.
20 See CHRISTOPHER J. DUERKSEN, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF INDUSTRIAL PLANT
SITING: HOW TO MAKE IT WORK BETTER 79-81 (1983) (noting that heavy-handed regulatory strategies
are unlikely to site industrial facilities successfully and were more likely to backfire); WILLIAM T.
GORMLEY, TAMING THE BUREAUCRACY: MUSCLES, PRAYERS, AND OTHER STRATEGIES 12, 16-17, 24-
29 (1989) (observing that "muscular" regulatory measures have become increasingly popular but have
delivered disappointing results); DAN M. KAHAN, THE LOGIC OF RECIPROCITY: A THEORY OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND LAW (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript ch. 4, at 3, on file with authors) ("The
idea that NIMBY can be overcome by offering host communities material compensation has proven
extremely popular with both commentators and policymakers. But after two decades of experimentation,
this strategy has produced only meager results.").
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researchers have attempted to understand the underlying logic of government
regulation with respect to the NIMBY problem: What is the nature of the
problem that prompts the necessity of siting regulations, how do regulations
address the core features of the NIMBY problem, and what factors (if any)
constitute an efficient regulatory response for a given NIMBY facility? We
argue that pursuing such a foundational examination of regulatory solutions to
the NIMBY problem will not only lead to a better understanding of the
problem's sources and solutions, but will also lead to better regulatory policy..
Specifically, we argue that successful land use policies require
policymakers to employ certain regulatory devices to match the specific
challenges presented by individual facilities. To be sure, siting regulations must
confront NIMBY opposition directly. If left alone in an uncorrected political
market, NIMBY opposition will succeed in blocking the implementation of a
socially desirable project; thus, political entities must control the political
process and limit public participation.21 Accordingly, under certain
circumstances, forceful regulatory responses that squelch NIMBY opposition
are necessary and, as such, superior to participatory schemes. Under different
circumstances, however, they generate policy outcomes that are decidedly less
preferable to a hybrid of democratic participation and regulatory oversight.
The theory of the firm and transaction cost economics offer useful
templates for understanding when incorporating public participation is useful
and how it can be utilized effectively. The standard transaction cost model
weighs the benefits of market pressures against the security of vertical
integration, and it argues that transactions in need of some, but not complete,
security should be governed within a market-hierarchy hybrid.22 This paper
relates the market-firm balance to a similar balance between participatory
democracy and forceful regulatory procedures, and it argues that regulations
should turn to negotiated compensation schemes for some but not all NIMBY
projects. Piggybacking on the extensive theory of the firm literature offers
policymakers a detailed model for how to tailor regulations to specific NIMBY
projects.
Part I begins with an overview of the NIMBY scenario, including the
political and economic problems that NIMBY disputes present and typical
regulatory responses to those problems. We observe that many states grant
developers the authoritative powers and political muscle to neglect community
opposition and squelch NIMBY resistance, and perhaps an equal number of
21 Just as the firm arises to correct for market failures, such as contractual holdups, contract
incompleteness, and bilateral monopolies, regulation and other political instruments arise to correct for
failures in the political market. The NIMBY challenge represents a failure of this second type because
parties in a NIMBY problem routinely fail to reach compromise in the political arena. See WILLIAMSON,
supra note 7, at ch. 8; see also the related literature on political market failures, supra note 6. For an
illustration of how NIMBY opposition leads to a political market failure, see Part IV, infra.
22 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 101-05. Market-hierarchy hybrids include long-term
contracts, relational contracts, and cross-ownership.
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states employ participatory mechanisms to facilitate negotiations. But all states
have developed their NIMBY regulations as a one-size-fits-all solution, and
none has pursued a hybrid strategy that appreciates that NIMBY problems vary
according to the facility to be sited and thus demand different regulatory
solutions. Part II reviews the current NIMBY literature, which is divided
sharply between those sympathetic to authoritarian regulatory responses and
those advocating participatory strategies. The section then introduces the recent
transaction cost analyses of government regulation, which is one instance in
which the theory of the firm extends into new terrain. This latest transaction
cost literature serves as an opening to the comprehensive analysis offered here.
In Part III we introduce our basic model for regulating the siting of waste
facilities, such as landfills, solid waste incinerators, and hazardous waste
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. 23 The basic premises underlying this
model are threefold. First, the NIMBY issue can be formulated as a contracting
problem in which a developer and a prospective host community negotiate over
the terms and conditions under which a facility will be allowed to operate.
Second, such transactions between developers and communities introduce
certain contractual obstacles, or hazards, that preclude efficient bargaining. And
third, this contracting problem can be understood through the lens of
transaction cost economics, which states that hierarchical mechanisms of
governance (e.g., contracts, firms, government controls, etc.) can support
transactions burdened by hazards.
24
Part IV then develops a comprehensive regulatory approach to siting
NIMBY facilities, which posits that certain regulatory mechanisms can
efficiently minimize transaction costs for siting certain categories of waste
facilities. The central argument is fashioned after transaction cost economics'
"discriminating alignment hypothesis": 25 Alternative regulatory regimes can be
matched with the siting of particular waste facilities so as to minimize
transaction costs. In other words, while regulation may often be necessary to
support siting a NIMBY project, reliance on a single regulatory process for
siting all facilities is unwise. Instead, regulations should be tailored to the
particular features of individual projects. This paper develops a taxonomy of
regulatory strategies, identifies the characteristics of particular waste facilities
that are important in NIMBY disputes, and proposes a methodology that
optimally matches types of siting regulations with the targeted waste facilities.
In articulating this theory of regulation, this Article moves beyond the
current literature by offering a comprehensive and generalizable model for
23 Waste and energy facilities were chosen for two reasons: First, these facilities have been
among the most intensely opposed land uses; and second, this notoriety has led to a large body of
literature upon which this paper could build.
24 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 7 at 65-74.
25 Id. at 105-06. The discriminating alignment hypothesis, stated completely, is that
transactions (which differ in their attributes) are aligned in a discriminating way with governance
structures (which differ in their costs and competencies) so as to minimize transaction costs.
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regulatory policy. Whereas previous efforts focus on a specific policy question
and formulate bifurcated policy options-such as whether a government should
26
use public employees or private contractors for a specific objective, or
whether a government should organize utility regulation under executive or
parliamentary control27 -this Article charts a model of regulatory policy that
offers recommendations for assorted public use demands. It thus provides a
template from which policymakers can design a menu of effective regulatory
policies. It also further illustrates the flexibility of Coase's original insight-
that the reciprocal competencies of market forces and vertical integration can
lead to valuable insights into the efficacy of alternative public policies.
Part IV then presents a preliminary empirical test of these hypotheses with
selected case studies. Though these studies do not rigorously test the model,
they indicate that viewing regulation as a mode of governance can provide
valuable insights. Moreover, they are selected to illustrate a cross-section of
scenarios--efforts to site different types of waste facilities and efforts to site
facilities under different regulatory regimes. Together, the case studies impart
three lessons. First, in the absence of a supportive regulatory regime, NIMBY
opposition will succeed in impeding the siting of noxious facilities. Second, a
regulatory regime that incorporates political participation from local political
interest groups can, for some projects, successfully site NIMBY facilities and,
importantly, can do so while accommodating local concerns. Such a regulatory
process-one that both sites a socially desirable facility and wins the support of
local communities-leads to land use outcomes that are superior to those that
follow from an authoritarian regulatory process. And third, however desirable it
may be to incorporate local political participation into siting a NIMBY facility,
and however useful input from local communities may be, such a participatory
regulatory process will simply fail to site some noxious but essential facilities.
Last, Part V remarks that the transaction cost template developed here can
inform regulatory policies that reach beyond NIMBY disputes. Just as the
NIMBY challenge can be modeled as a contracting problem, in which the
regulatory process facilitates an agreement between two or more parties, other
regulatory disputes can be similarly modeled. Since much of modem
administrative law places government agencies in the position to facilitate
disputes between different interest groups,28 our transaction cost model offers
lessons for rulemaking procedures designed to solicit comment and forge
consensus-oriented policies. In short, the template offered herein applies to
policy challenges beyond the siting of noxious facilities and to political
disputes beyond the NIMBY problem.
26 See supra note 4.
27 See supra note 5.
28 See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive
Law, 72 VA. L. REv. 253, 253-58 (1986).
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I. The NIMBY Problem
A. NIAB Yas a Political Economic Problem
A NIMBY is defined as a socially desirable land use that broadly
distributes benefits, yet is difficult or impossible to implement because of local
opposition. While most often associated with polluting and waste facilities,
NIMBY problems afflict a broad range of land uses, including airports, prisons,
sports stadiums, power plants, halfway houses, and low-income housing
29projects.
Two important characteristics make each of these facilities a potential
NIMBY problem. The first is that the project, if implemented, will generate an
overall increase to social surplus. 30 We define NIMBY problems as projects
that are difficult to site only because of inequalities in distribution.
Consequently, a NIMBY project generates additional surplus such that efficient
transfer payments could, in theory, distribute gains in a manner that will entice
all actors to support it.31 All NIMBY projects are potentially Pareto improving.
Second, the nature of the costs and benefits associated with these facilities
virtually assures local opposition. Although the benefits of NIMBY projects,
such as airports, prisons, and low-income housing, are typically dispersed
among a relatively large population, the costs and risks of these projects are
normally concentrated on a small group of residents in the host community.
32
To residents who live near these facilities, the costs are almost always greater
than the benefits, and they are usually better off if the project is either located
elsewhere or not completed at all.
Even though NIMBY projects benefit more actors than they harm, and
even though they generate an overall gain in social surplus, the nature of
democratic institutions makes it extremely difficult for them to win political
support.33 Consequently, they often succumb to a political process that yields to
concentrated costs over diffuse benefits. 34 Citizens residing near proposed sites
for NIMBY facilities can both experience nuisances associated with the
facilities (e.g., noise from airports) and can also fear suffering from such
29 For brief discussion of such NIMBY projects, see Michael B. Gerrard, The Victims of
NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495 (1994).
30 One important qualification must be noted. Any of these facilities can be planned
inefficiently-i.e., can be constructed and sited in such a manner that they generate a decline in total
surplus. A project's qualification as a NIMBY problem depends not just on the nature of the facility
itself but also on contributing circumstances.
31 This follows the Coase Theorem, made famous in Ronald Coase's seminal article, see
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
32 See RABE, supra note 10, at 1-2.
33 See PORTNEY, supra note 8, at 65-67.
34 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIvE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS (1965).
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nuisances. 35 Exposure, both actual and anticipated, to such concentrated costs
provides strong incentives to organize, attend local hearings, 36 lobby politicians
and, if necessary, file legal challenges. 37 In contrast, the benefits associated
with these facilities are both broadly distributed (e.g., the benefits of an airport
are spread to all travelers) and, compared to the local costs, diffusely allocated
(the utility of enjoying expanded travel options is far outweighed by the
disutility of constantly hearing airplanes overhead; it also is insufficient to
induce an individual to volunteer in the political process and fight on behalf of
an airport project). Consequently, few individuals aside from a project's
developer have an incentive to advocate that a particular site under
consideration is the best location for a project.38 Even the developer's attempts
to argue that the overall gains outweigh the overall costs are often dismissed by
opponents as self-serving. Consequently, widespread public support for locally
undesirable land uses is generally lacking and is overcome by local opposition.
This opposition is frequently sufficient to defeat most locally undesirable
facilities, including those that provide net social benefits. 39
These two conditions--overall efficiency and proneness to stifling
political opposition-are particularly evident in the siting of solid and
hazardous waste facilities. Economies of scale resulting from the large fixed
costs associated with most waste facilities typically make it efficient to have
one large facility servicing the waste needs of an entire region. However, the
actual and perceived costs to neighbors associated with these facilities increase
with facility size, so larger (and more efficient) facilities often elicit stronger
public opposition than would smaller projects. Large regional facilities also
encounter local hostility since residents perceive that they are bearing the costs
of disposing of "other people's" waste.4 1 Furthermore, unlike projects such as
airports and various industrial activities that can spark additional investment,
solid and hazardous waste facilities normally provide few compensating
35 Michael O'Hare & Debra Sanderson, Facility Siting and Compensation: Lessons from the
Massachusetts Experience, 12 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS MGMT. 364 (1993).
36 GREGORY E. McAvOy, CONTROLLING TECHNOCRACY: CITIZEN RATIONALITY AND THE
NIMBY SYNDROME 124-25 (1999).
37 See Johnson, supra note 13, at 609-14; cf GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN,
SLAPPs: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT 2-3, 106-07 (1996) (describing the phenomenon of the
government filing suits against citizens, strategic lawsuits against public participation).
38 Lawrence S. Bacow & James R. Milkey, Overcoming Local Opposition to Hazardous
Waste Facilities: The Massachusetts Approach, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 265,268-69 (1982).
39 O'HARE ET AL., supra note 12.
40 Howard Kunreuther et al., A Compensation Mechanism for Siting Noxious Facilities:
Theory and Experimental Design, 14 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 371 (1987).
41 Larger facilities also distort traditional, common-law approaches to solving land-use
disputes. As the magnitude of a nuisance increases, the number of affected persons increases. With
multiple parties, common-law approaches to solving nuisance disputes become less efficient. The
transaction costs associated with negotiating agreements increases geometrically as the number of
people involved in the process increases. See JOHN O'LOONEY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL: BALANCING BUSINEss AND COMMUNITY IN AN AGE OF NIMBYS AND
LULUs (1995).
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benefits to their host communities. Most facilities, for instance, provide
relatively few new jobs and only modest tax revenues.42 With few concentrated
benefits for local residents, it is difficult for a waste facility developer to rally
host community support.4 3
Chances for public support for siting waste facilities have been further
injured by recent political developments. The industry's past failures to use
environmentally sound waste disposal practices and the public fallout
associated with many of these failures (e.g., Love Canal,44 Times Beach, the
Santa Barbara oil fires, etc.) have severely damaged facility developers'
credibility in the public eye.45 Moreover, a large, vocal, and well-funded
environmental movement has heightened public anxiety about the dangers
posed by waste facilities and has become an important force in challenging new
developments.46 As a result, waste facilities are often perceived to pose greater
risks to public health and safety than other locally undesirable facilities and are
consequently especially prone to NIMBY political problems.47
Combined, these features present solid and hazardous waste facilities as a
good vehicle to understand the NIMBY problem. While cost-effective
development of such facilities encourages developers to build large facilities in
one locale that service many other communities, the costs of siting large
projects are shared unequally and create political dynamics that make attracting
the requisite public support extremely difficult. The challenge this NIMBY
problem presents policy makers is to create a political process that will site
socially necessary facilities in a manner both responsive to the market demands
of municipal solid waste and attentive to the preferences of adversely affected
citizens.
B. Responses to NIMBY
A variety of public and private policies have emerged to respond to this
political challenge. Traditionally, developers sited facilities using what has
been termed the "DAD" paradigm: Decide, Announce, and Defend.48
42 Bacow & Milkey, supra note 38; Frank Popper, LULUs and Their Blockage: The Nature of
the Problem, the Outline of the Solutions, in CONFRONTING REGIONAL CHALLENGES: APPROACHES TO
LULUs, GROWTH, AND OTHER VEXING GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS, supra note 11, at 13.
43 See KAHAN, supra note 20, at 1 ("[Slince each community would be better off were
another to host that facility, all the communities resist.") (emphasis added).
44 CHARLES A. WENTZ, HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT 306-12 (1989).
45 See Thomas Lambert & Christopher Boerner, Environmental Inequity: Economic Causes,
Economic Solutions, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 195, 196 (1997) (noting that civil rights activists have recently
joined forces with environmental groups to oppose construction of many solid and hazardous waste
facilities on environmental justice grounds).
46 O'LOONEY, supra note 41; Bacow & Milkey, supra note 38; Herbert Inhaber, Of LULUs,
NIMBYs, and NIMTOOs, PUB. INT., Spring 1992, at 52, 63.
47 McAvoY, supra note 36, at 94-97.
48 See RABE, supra note 10, at 28 ("Whether advanced by private or public entities, siting
proposals are characteristically made with no prior consultation with targeted communities.").
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Developers decided the best location for their facility, took out options on the
land, announced to political leaders of the community their intention to site,
and then defended their decisions from local opposition groups.49 Under this
strategy, developers competed against local opposition in an open political
arena without the support of a regulatory siting process.
In the face of growing NIMBY opposition, however, the "DAD" strategy
became increasingly unsuccessful, and developers were forced to pursue
alternative tactics. Two new paradigms emerged. The first was obtaining
regulatory protection from the state that could preempt local politics and
override NIMBY opposition. Under this approach, a state agency is instructed
to determine whether additional waste facilities are needed, consult with
developers to determine where the facilities should be located, and then use
strong-arm tactics to impose the decisions on resisting communities.
Sometimes state agencies are permitted to use eminent domain powers, but in
all cases the state regulatory process foreclosed the traditional political or legal
mechanisms that opponents to the proposed facility normally could employ to
stop the project. Some states permit local officials and representatives of
affected communities to serve on the supervising state agency, but this often
amounted to no more than token representation. Consequently, waste facility
developers had only to interact with state officials and could largely avoid their
political opponents. Most states opted for this coercive regulatory scheme, and
it remains the predominant regulatory process that guides the siting of noxious
facilities.50
A second approach has been labeled a market-based or compensation-
based strategy, whereby developers devise mechanisms to compensate locally
affected communities for their proximity to a noxious facility. 51 Initially, many
developers voluntarily pursued negotiations with representatives of prospective
host communities in the hope of eliminating the causes of local opposition. 2 In
theory, these compensation schemes should always find a price that
communities would accept and developers would pay to site the facility.
Negotiations typically devised creative compensation schemes, such as
constructing community projects, building public parks, or promising jobs and
job training. Some siting agreements commit the developer to undertake actions
to mitigate a facility's adverse impacts, such as creating a buffer zone around
the noxious facility or providing emergency response systems, and others
include particular obligations that the community may assume regarding the
sited project.53
49 Lambert & Boerner, supra note 45, at 222.
50 See PORTNEY, supra note 8, at 8-10, 49-52; RABE, supra note 10, at 44-56.
51 See O'HTARE ET AL., supra note 12; RABE, supra note 10, at 33-44.
52 RABE, supra note 10, at 33-44; Interview with William Ruckelshaus, CEO, Browning-
Ferris Industries, in St. Louis, Mo. (Apr. 28, 1995).
53 Interview with Ruckelshaus, supra note 52. Other actions frequently included in siting
agreements are the provision of necessary infrastructure, such as a transportation network or a sewer
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Negotiations between developers and concerned local parties open a
remarkable potential for improving the process for siting facilities-not only
will community members have a voice in nearby projects, but developers also
will acquire valuable, constructive information about local concerns and
unforeseen costs a project would impose. However, these private negotiation
initiatives have met with only moderate success, motivating the promulgation
of a second category of state siting regulations: regulations designed to
facilitate, or gently require, negotiations between developers and local
communities to devise compensation schemes.54 This generation of regulations
was fashioned to assist these negotiations and to encourage similar negotiation
for situations in which bargaining was otherwise difficult. Most of these
regulations were directed toward improving the exchange of information
between developers of waste facilities and key constituents within prospective
host communities, altering the process by which developers and local
community representatives negotiate, and allowing the state to intervene
directly in the siting process.
The advantage that compensation and market schemes have over
preemptive regimes is clear. Assuming both successfully site socially necessary
facilities, market mechanisms induce affected parties to reveal private
information, convey preferences, and devise creative solutions to the NIMBY
problem. 55 Since the social objective is not just to site necessary facilities but to
do so efficiently (i.e., maximizing some approximation of social utility), any
regime that elicits the preferences of affected communities and orchestrates a
compensation scheme would be, by hypothesis, superior to the unilateral
decision of a developer or regulator. A critical question, however, is whether
these negotiation-based strategies do, in fact, site facilities reliably. They are
viable solutions to NIMBY challenges only if they overcome NIMBY
opposition.
In sum, three siting strategies have replaced the traditional unilateral
approach: seeking preemptive regulatory authority, pursuing voluntary
negotiations with host communities, and the intermediate strategy of
developing regulations that facilitate and require negotiations. As the following
Part describes, each of these regulatory strategies has its advocates and, as Part
IV illustrates, each strategy has, at best, a mixed record.
56
system, and pledges to use clean technologies. Compensation payments may also include direct cash
payments to the community or financial guarantees to uphold land values. In return for these steps, the
community often pledges to support the project and provide various support services.
54 O'HARE ET AL., supra note 12; RABE, supra note 10, at 33-44; O'Hare & Sanderson, supra
note 35.
55 See Barak D. Richman, Mandating Negotiations To Resolve the NIMBY Problem. A
Creative Regulatory Response, 20 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 223, 233-36 (2002).
56 Some commentators are less generous, describing the existing regulatory strategies as
genuine failures. See sources cited supra note 20.
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II. NIMBY Scholarship and Proposed Solutions
The rise of certain regulations as a response to siting difficulties has
attracted significant attention from academics. Three approaches stand out in
the literature. The first, which is home to a majority of the relevant scholarship,
takes a normative approach to the NIMBY challenge, whereby researchers
advocate a regulatory recipe to resolve the NIMBY political impasse. The
second, which is more removed from our purposes but nonetheless deserves
attention, is chiefly predictive and uses economic models of the political
process to generate positive predictions of regulatory outcomes. The third
perspective is the transaction cost economics methodology, which explains how
regulations can facilitate economic transactions either between two private
parties or between private and public entities. Although we place our approach
within the normative camp since we propose here a model for regulatory
reform, our analysis assumes the same wide-angled lens that is employed in
transaction cost models.
A. Normative Approaches
A fundamental dispute swirls in academic circles over whether siting
regulations are a solution to the NIMBY impasse or part of the problem. The
"property rights" school falls into the latter category and expresses genuine
skepticism towards regulatory efforts to site noxious facilities. According to
these scholars, the siting problem is one of ambiguously specified property
rights.
Robert Cameron Mitchell and Richard T. Carson, for instance, argue that
under current siting regulations neither the developer nor the community holds
clear property rights. 57 On the one hand, local communities use strict zoning
and safety regulations to assert their right to be free of NIMBY projects, and on
the other, state siting boards have typically countered these efforts by granting
competing siting rights to developers. The competing layers of regulatory rights
make property rights ambiguous and impede efficient negotiations for land
uses. Mitchell and Carson suggest that states should officially recognize the de
facto property rights assumed by local communities, and this would allow
prospective developers to freely negotiate siting terms with these
communities. 58 This argument is akin to traditional law and economics
scholarship that focuses on selecting a legal rule, usually assigning property
rights or liability, in order to achieve optimal incentives. Most of these
arguments presuppose that once property rights are specified, court
adjudication is sufficient to identify when siting agreements have been violated,
57 Robert Cameron Mitchell & Richard T. Carson, Property Rights, Protest, and the Siting of
Hazardous Waste Facilities, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 285 (1986).
58 Id.
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assess the behavior of the responsible actors, assign liability, and, when
required, compensate victims.
5 9
The primary problem with the property rights school is that the recent
waves of regulatory innovations have proven its inadequacy. The rise of the
intractable NIMBY problems arose chiefly before developers and planners
turned to regulatory policies to overcome local opposition. The emergence of
the alternative regulatory solutions itself is evidence that securing property
rights, without more, is inadequate to site noxious facilities.
6 1
A more fundamental problem with the property rights approach is its
failure to appreciate the complexities inherent in the NIMBY phenomenon. At
its core, the property rights approach presumes that efficient bargaining, akin to
the Coasean world of zero transaction costs, 62 is possible and would occur were
it not for inefficient regulatory interventions. Empirical evidence certainly
suggests otherwise, as NIMBY negotiations are laden with emotional and
coordination pitfalls that prevent efficient bargaining. 63 But there is a more
methodological difficulty with this approach. It is a critique that compares
current siting regulations to a hypothetical ideal, rather than to feasible
alternatives. 64 It is easy to point out how siting regulations, or any government
intervention, would generate inefficiencies in a perfectly efficient market with
costless negotiations, if for no other reason than because they directly interfere
with any "invisible hand" that a free market may offer. But such neoclassical
assumptions do not consider the complex realities of negotiating certain
transactions, and they overlook fundamental bargaining hazards that preclude
laissez-faire efficiency. Explicit comparisons of existing siting regulations to
hypothetical or untested ideals (to which few markets can aspire and against
which no regulation can compete) are helpful neither in modeling the problem
nor in suggesting its solution.
A closer examination of the property rights approach reveals some
additional problems. Efficient bargaining rests on an accurate reflection of the
affected community's preferences and its ability to organize and negotiate
proficiently, but any community is home to competing views and contrasting
preferences. Mitchell and Carson suggest establishing communal property
59 See Peter S. Menell, The Limitations of Legal Institutions for Addressing Environmental
Risks, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 93 (1991) (discussing the property rights approach to siting noxious facilities
and its potential flaws in addressing environmental problems). See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992); STEVEN SHAVELL, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ACCIDENT LAW (1987).
60 See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
61 See also infra Part IV, for additional evidence that siting noxious facilities requires
regulatory supports.
62 See Coase, supra note 31.
63 See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
64 This critique of economic orthodoxy is inherent in much of the transaction cost literature.
See WILLIAMSON, supra note 7.
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rights to allow communities to accept or reject a proposed NIMBY project.65
Although their argument may have some theoretical appeal, translating theory
into practice reveals the difficulty of establishing clearly defined and
enforceable property rights when many actors are involved. One possibility is
to use referenda for the approval of new developments. But these have been
thwarted by individual community members representing minority views who
routinely engage in various legal and extra-legal tactics to end-run the
referendum process and stop an approved development. 66 Another possibility,
as some negotiation literature suggests, is to appoint neighborhood leaders to
represent the interests and exercise the property rights of the host community.
67
But this is equally vulnerable to opportunities for defection and non-
cooperation by smaller factions. Given the complexity of the political
process-and the complexities inherent in a NIMBY dispute-a regulatory
superstructure to organize interested parties and facilitate negotiations is a
prerequisite to effective bargaining. Any disdain by the property rights camp
for regulatory interventions is therefore hypocritical.
Another normative approach to solve NIMBY problems, the "mechanism
design" strategy, is more supportive of regulatory solutions. Researchers in this
camp have directed their efforts toward developing government regulations and
designing alternative siting mechanisms that would maximize some composite
of social utility.68 Several noteworthy examples fall into this camp, such as
Howard Kunreuther's proposed sealed-bid auction mechanisms for siting
noxious facilities, 69 Herbert Inhaber's proposals to employ a reverse Dutch
auction,70 and Michael O'Hare's 71 and Lawrence Bacow's and James
Milkey's 72 research on the use of compensation schemes. While critical of
current siting processes, researchers in this branch maintain that appropriate
government programs can reduce or eliminate current siting difficulties.
65 Mitchell & Carson, supra note 57.
66 There is a frequent and inescapable tension between referenda, which bestow decision-
making responsibilities to citizens, and the legislative process, which confers authority to elected
officials. Employing one political mechanism inherently weakens the other. See, e.g., Schwarzenegger's
Risky End Run, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, March 3, 2005, at 8.
67 See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & PATRICK FIELD, DEALING WITH AN ANGRY PUBLIC 99-100
(1996); Alun Richards, Using Co-management To Build Community Support for Waste Facilities, in
HAZARDOUS WASTE SITING AND DEMOCRATIC CHOICE, supra note 9, at 321, 321-22, 331-37. See
generally LAWRENCE SUSSKIND ET AL., NEGOTIATING ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS (2000).
68 The objective, of course, is not just to site socially desirable yet noxious facilities but to do
so efficiently, which requires eliciting local preferences and likely involves compensating local
communities. Thus, while preemptive regulation may successfully site facilities, it does not attempt to
(and thus likely fails to) maximize social utility.
69 Paul R. Kleindorfer & Howard Kunreuther, A Sealed-Bid Auction Mechanism for Siting
Noxious Facilities, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 295 (1986); Kunreuther et al., supra note 40.
70 HERBERT INHABER, SLAYING THE NIMBY DRAGON passim (1998); see also Inhaber,
supra note 46.
71 O'HARE ET AL., supra note 12; O'Hare & Sanderson, supra note 35.
72 Bacow & Milkey, supra note 38.
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A growing literature within the field of negotiation can also be placed in
the mechanism design school. Resting on theories from an amalgam of fields,
such as economics, psychology, and political science, this collection of
research scrutinizes common bargaining strategies employed by developers and
host communities. 73 These works identify certain elements of the negotiation or
mediation process that create gridlock, and they proceed to develop normative
approaches to aid developers in negotiating with host communities. 74 Many of
these strategic recommendations include entering into a "consensual approach"
that encourages participants to create a voluntary, ad hoc discussion forum to
resolve disputes.75 Other works encourage employing public mediators who can
formalize an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. 76 Most of this literature
presupposes that negotiation strategies can arrive at Pareto-improving
resolutions when one is theoretically possible, 77 and the challenge is to
encourage parties to commit to a negotiation process and collectively explore
value-creating options.
The primary problem with these mechanism design proposals is that they
advance a one-size-fits-all solution for a host of diverse NIMBY challenges.
Yet the problems associated with siting an airport are not the same as the
problems associated with siting a nuclear power plant. Asymmetric
information, complexity, and other contractual hazards are at the heart of many
NIMBY disputes, but these hazards vary significantly according to the type of
facility in question. Specifically, a negotiation-based regulatory strategy may
work for one type of noxious facility but may fail to successfully site another.
A land use policy that recognizes these differences will appreciate that a
regulatory mechanism that deals effectively with one NIMBY dispute may be
ill-suited to deal with others. This variation in siting facilities, and the
subsequent variation in the performance of regulatory mechanisms, demands a
flexible regulatory policy.78
One illustration of the shortcomings of a one-size-fits-all approach and its
faith in negotiated solutions is Bacow and Milkey's efforts to institute incentive
73 See, e.g., PORTNEY, supra note 8, at 123-36.
74 See id at 138-39 (introducing risk substitution as an alternative approach).
75 LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL
APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES (1987); SUSSKIND ET AL., supra note 67.
76 Susan Carpenter, Dealing with Environmental and Other Complex Public Disputes, in
COMMUNITY MEDIATION: A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS AND RESEARCHERS 313 (Karen Grover
Duffy et al. eds., 1991).
77 One interesting exception is Dan Kahan's critique of compensation-based schemes to
resolve NIMBY disputes because citizens do not simply weigh the costs of noxious facilities versus the
benefits of compensation, but rather evaluate siting decisions on principles of reciprocity of fairness. See
Dan Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 89
(2003) (arguing that "individuals can be made receptive to the siting of noxious facilities in their
communities if they can be made to believe that society is committed to treating their interests with
respect"); see also, KAHAN, supra note 20.
78 These mechanism design proposals also lack a nuanced understanding of negotiating
NIMBY disputes-a defect that also plagues the property rights approaches. Many of these nuances, or
contracting hazards, are detailed in Section III.B.
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and compensation schemes to replace traditional preemptive siting
approaches. 79 In part due to Bacow and Milkey's research and lobbying efforts,
Massachusetts passed the Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act
of 1980, which requires hazardous waste facility developers to negotiate
compensation packages with prospective host communities. 80 Unfortunately,
the purported improvements offered by these incentive approaches have not
materialized. As Michael O'Hare and Debra Sanderson point out,
Massachusetts has not seen any improvement in the siting process since the
negotiation statute was enacted.8' Indeed, no new hazardous waste facilities
have been sited since the statute was passed in 1980, despite a significant
demand.82 Without discounting the contribution made by Bacow and Milkey's
scholarship, it is clear in this instance that claims regarding the inadequacies of
the traditional siting process are in need of qualification. 83 Simply put, the
compensation schemes are far from fatally flawed, but they have substantial
limitations. Proponents of such schemes, including Bacow and Milkey,
overlook the contracting hazards inherent in siting waste facilities, and the
market-oriented incentive approach they advocate has apparently been
inadequate in overcoming political opposition.
In short, much of the normative literature addressing the NIMBY
challenge has been too quick to criticize preemptive regulations and perhaps
too confident in compensation or negotiation strategies. If the objective is to
site facilities while considering the welfare of affected communities, and
perhaps devising compensation schemes for those communities, then
preemptive strategies are open for cutting criticism. However, both the property
rights and the mechanism design schools fail to recognize some of the
difficulties in reaching agreements for siting noxious facilities and thus oversell
their own approaches. A better approach is to evaluate these alternative regimes
according to their reciprocal strengths and deficiencies, such that regulatory
strategies balance efficiency motives with the realistic hazards of political
opportunism.
B. Positive Political Approaches
A second approach to understanding the emergence of regulation in
response to NIMBY disputes involves a positive perspective of the political
process. According to this approach, political interest groups organize to
79 Bacow & Milkey, supra note 38. See generally, SUSAN BROWER BOYLE, AN ANALYSIS OF
SITING NEW HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITIES THROUGH A COMPENSATION AND
INCENTIVES APPROACH (1982) (proposing compensation schemes to site hazardous waste facilities and
discussing four case studies).
80 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. chs. 21C, 21D (West 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A
(West 2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111 (West 2003).
81 O'Hare & Sanderson, supra note 35, at 364.
82 Id.
83 See PORTNEY, supra note 8, at 58.
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influence the development of regulatory rules, aiming to enact rules that would
best meet their particularistic interests. Thus an understanding of a polity's
interest groups, their competing preferences, their relative resources, and the
polity's political process enables the prediction of political outcomes. This
school has its roots in George Stigler's 84 and Sam Peltzman's examinations of
regulated industries, and it has burgeoned to study how numerous regulatory
and political processes are shaped by institutional configurations and a political
market for votes.85 Positive political theory would predict that siting regulation
has emerged to meet the particularistic needs of developers and organized
community interests (whether environmental groups, civil rights groups, or
some organized combination thereof). It would further predict that the
regulations would favor the organized groups that invest the greatest amount of
resources in the political process, and conversely, positive theory has useful
explanatory power to predict regulatory outcomes.
Even though our emphasis is chiefly normative, positive theories of
regulation are specifically helpful to our enterprise because they help explain
the current matrix of regulations, with all its shortcomings. Political powers can
skew such regimes to be either excessively pro-developer or pro-community.
Polities with powerful pro-development interest groups, for example, would
yield regulatory regimes that are friendly to developers' needs and would give
little opportunity for local opposition to deter or usefully inform a siting
process. Such regulatory regimes would generate what we label "over-
regulation"-the use of authoritarian regulations that preempt market-based
dialogue when more participatory and negotiation-based regulations would
achieve better outcomes. Similarly, polities with anti-developer and pro-
neighborhood alignments would create a political process that offers inadequate
regulatory support, or "under-regulation," for NIMBY projects. Such regimes
make NIMBY projects particularly vulnerable to attack from local opposition
and thus fail to construct socially necessary facilities. 86 Put differently, our
analysis does not assume ex post efficiency-i.e., that the regulatory regimes
we observe are, in any respect, socially optimal-and positive political theory
explains how the political process creates the inefficient regulatory regimes that
we propose to amend.
Another useful purpose for positive political theory in our analysis is that
it heightens our sensitivity to the political environment in which siting
regulations are enacted. Our focus on NIMBYs as a contracting problem
84 George J. Stigler, The Economic Theory of Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971).
85 Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976);
see also Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74
AM. ECON. REV. 279 (1984); James M. Snyder, Jr., Campaign Contributions as Investments: The U.S.
House of Representatives, 1980-1986, 98 J. POL. EcON. 1195 (1990). This is a very large school of
literature, and we intend only to introduce it briefly here.
86 The case studies of Philadelphia and Massachusetts, infra Part IV, illustrate instances of
inadequate regulatory support.
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between opposing parties-and our resulting attention to the microanalytic
details of the resulting NIMBY dispute-requires an awareness of the
surrounding political environment, the relative power of competing interest
groups, and the relevant political processes. 87 A siting process that considers
the particular features of each particular NIMBY project must include a
consideration of the political environment in which the siting process takes
place. In other words, for the same reason a one-size-fits-all approach to siting
different facilities is doomed to failure in any polity, a one-solution-for-all
policy prescription for all polities is doomed to failure in siting any particular
waste facility.
In sum, although our model measures the efficiency of all outcomes
according to certain theoretical criteria, developed below, our analysis must
take into account lessons from positive political theories. Accordingly, the
transaction cost approach is not at cross-purposes with positive analysis but,
instead, incorporates and is informed by it.
C. Transaction Cost Approaches
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) offers an alternative approach to
understanding NIMBY problems and their regulatory remedies. Although much
of the research in TCE has focused on the firm-market boundary, the theory has
broader applicability.88 TCE maintains that any problem that arises as or can be
posed as a contracting problem can be examined in transaction cost economics
terms. 89 Thus, to the extent one can think of regulation as a response to a
contracting problem, TCE analysis can be fruitful.
Works by Victor Goldberg and Oliver Williamson are credited for being
the first to approach regulation as a response to transactions that were difficult
to contract. 90 Goldberg chastised critics of regulation (many of whom could
now fall into the normative schools discussed above) for not appreciating the
contractual complexity of private alternatives. 91 Hazards inherent in the nature
of commonly regulated activities make most private alternatives non-
remediable, leading instead to "administered contracts" that often involve
intervention from a public agency to provide long-term administrative supports.
Williamson fleshes out these contracting difficulties in examining efforts to
87 See, e.g., Levy & Spiller, supra note 5 (explaining, in a cross-national study, how
differences in political and regulatory environments explain the varying success of private investment).
88 See, e.g., Howard Shelanski & Peter Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction Cost
Economics: A Review and Assessment, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 335 (1995); JEFFREY T. MACHER &
BARAK D. RICHMAN, TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS: AN ASSESSMENT OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Duke Law School Mimeo, 2005).
89 WILLIAMSON, supra note 7.
90 Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. 426 (1976);
Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-In General and with Respect to
CA TV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73 (1976).
91 Goldberg, supra note 90.
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provide cable television to the city of Oakland.92 The transactions involved in
such a fixed-cost endeavor for a municipality were laden with contractual
hazards motivated by both economic and political circumstances. Williamson
concludes that the (comparatively) efficient mechanism to oversee such
economic activity is administrative contracts that allow for public intervention
and renegotiation.
Building on these specific case studies, a more general approach has
developed in which the individual hazards within specific transactions are
matched with appropriate governance mechanisms. In short, governance
mechanisms-whether regulation or other institutions-arise to address and
mitigate specific hazards. This literature has been joined by broader theoretical
treatments by Avinash Dixit and more recent work by Williamson, both of
whom explicitly characterize regulation as a governance mechanism.93 These
efforts formulate the entire spectrum of public sector activity as an array of
transactions, each with varied types and degrees of hazards. Regulation, along
with other public institutions, arises as a transaction cost-minimizing response
to govern certain political and economic activities.
This paper pursues the path set forth by the recent work of Dixit and
Williamson by viewing regulation as akin to a hybrid mode of governance in
the markets-and-hierarchies template of traditional transaction cost theory. 94 In
our formulation, different regulatory mechanisms can manifest in a diverse
collection of public interventions in the private market, and consequently they
can possess different governing attributes. Figure 1 below, adapted from
Williamson's 1999 article, Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction
Cost Economics Perspective,95 illustrates how regulation as a hybrid form fits
into traditional TCE analysis.
92 Williamson, supra note 90.
93 AVINASH K. DIXIT, THE MAKING OF ECONOMIC POLICY: A TRANSACTION-COST POLITICS
PERSPECTIVE (1996); Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost
Economics Perspective, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 306 (1999).
94 Williamson, supra note 93.
95 Id.
Yale Journal on Regulation
Figure 196
This paper focuses on the different administrative mechanisms that span
from the regulation node, representing the regulation of a private firm, to the
public agency, representing public ownership of the particular economic
activity (we highlight this "Area of Interest" in Figure 1). Our framework
illustrates the logic of government regulation with respect to the NIMBY
problem. Siting noxious facilities is essentially a contracting issue in which a
facility developer and local residents negotiate the terms and conditions under
which a proposed facility will be located in a given community. However,
various attributes associated with noxious facilities-specifically solid and
hazardous waste facilities-jeopardize these negotiations. The analytical
process of observing contracting hazards and identifying the corresponding
governance mechanisms that offer useful solutions is the essential exercise in
TCE. This process is applied below to siting waste facilities and their
corresponding siting regulations.
III. A TCE Approach to NIMBY
Employing TCE analysis to understand siting regulations for solid and
hazardous waste facilities involves a three-step process. The first is to articulate
the exact nature and degree of the contractual hazards posed by such waste
96 Figure based on id. at 337. In TCE heuristics, the letter k denotes transactional hazards, and
the letter s denotes contractual safeguards. Figure 1 reflects all feasible values for k and s, and TCE
predicts a positive correlation between k and s. Specifically, when k = 0, transactions can occur
unassisted in the spot market without safeguards, and when k > 0, transactions will likely find their
optimal governance structure where s > 0. The conditions k > 0 and s = 0 reflect the "unrelieved
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facilities and how these hazards might prevent efficient facility siting. The
second is to identify the regulatory governance mechanisms that have evolved
to deal with these hazards and explain how these regulations can facilitate the
siting of controversial waste facilities. The third is to formulate a hypothesis
that explains how a proper alignment of regulatory mechanisms with specific
siting transactions generates efficient returns. After formulating the siting
process as a formal contracting problem, this Part proceeds through each of
these steps.
A. The Contracting Problem
Formulated as a contracting problem, siting a waste facility requires an
agreement between the developer and those others, mostly local residents,
adversely affected. Without an agreement, local residents can sue the developer
and claim damages or invade the political process and create gridlock.
Conversely, an agreement between the developer and those affected can
include provisions that will avoid imposing costs on residents or appropriately
compensate those residents who do experience costs.
Waste facilities deemed to be NIMBY projects create additional social
surplus, so, theoretically, transfer payments may be made to appropriately
compensate residents for the costs imposed by the facility. In a world of
efficient bargaining and zero transaction costs, this is accomplished in a
straightforward manner: A developer announces a planned facility, local
residents will demand compensation for the costs the facility will inflict, and
the developer meets each resident's reservation utility through transfer
payments.
97
Many developers now pursue this strategy through negotiation.
98
Typically, negotiations for a siting agreement begin between a facility
developer and representatives of the affected local municipalities, often
represented by a citizens' committee.9 9 Beyond the terms and conditions under
which a facility will be sited, virtually any subject is open for discussion.
Among the items often arising in negotiations and included in final agreements
are direct payments between developers and the affected municipalities,
property value protection, disposal privileges, availability of local roads and
utility services, operation guidelines, creation of standing oversight
committees, and the provision of various community amenities, such as parks
and playgrounds.10 0 Final agreements can also spell out dispute resolution
97 See Coase, supra note 31.
98 See O'HARE ET AL., supra note 12 (discussing case studies); SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK,
supra note 75 (proffering a suggested template to pursue a negotiation strategy); supra notes 52-53 and
accompanying text.
99 For example, the Massachusetts statute requires citizen participation through Local
Assessment Committees (LACs). PORTNEY, supra note 8, at 57-58.
100 List compiled from a review of contracts filed with the Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resources.
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procedures, such as appeal to state agencies or the use of binding arbitration.' 0 1
A successful siting process will typically (1) enable the contractual parties to
engage in bargaining over the specific terms under which a facility will be
allowed to operate; (2) provide mechanisms to facilitate adaptation to changing
conditions over the life of the facility; and (3) establish a means by which
parties can enforce agreements.
B. Hazards
In a world of complete certainty and zero transaction costs, the above
conditions are easily met, and fully contingent and binding agreements can be
reached. In such a world, all relevant parties are known in advance, all effects
of the facility are known and specified ex ante, and contractual performance is
transparent ex post.
But the real world is quite different, and Coase himself emphasized that
thinking about a world without transaction costs is "without value except as
steps on the way to the analysis of the real world of positive transaction
costs."' 0 2 Continuing down that analytical path requires recognizing that all
contracts are unavoidably incomplete. Siting solid and hazardous waste
facilities are transactions laden with uncertainty, impacted information, lack of
trust, and other difficulties-or, to use TCE terminology, "contracting
hazards"-that impede efficient bargaining. Faced with this incompleteness
and the resulting transaction costs, efforts to guard against contractual hazards
take on added importance. Four of these potential hazards warrant particular
attention: negotiating externalities, measurement problems, asset specificity,
and political opportunism.
1. Negotiating Externalities
Efficient bargaining requires a solid definition of property rights, 03 but
when a developer wants to negotiate with a community, it is not obvious who
deserves standing, i.e., who can reasonably claim to be adversely affected by a
facility at a specific site. Moreover, those whom the proposed facility genuinely
will harm may have different interests and exhibit conflicting demands for
compensation. Thus, one of the most important prerequisites to entering
negotiations, and one of the first major hurdles facing a private developer in the
siting process, is determining who represents the community in negotiations.
101 O'HARE ET AL., supra note 12, at 170-71; SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 75, at
198-99.
102 Ronald H. Coase, The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core: A Comment, 24 J.L. & ECON.
183, 187 (1981). Coase continues, "We do not do well to devote ourselves to a detailed study of the
world of zero transaction costs, like augurs divining the future by the minute inspection of the entrails of
a goose." Id.
103 Coase, supra note 31.
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Individual parties within a community, however, have certain incentives
not to enter into organized bargaining with the rest of the community. Any
party who can claim legal standing and can file a lawsuit may be able to halt
construction of a facility and force direct negotiations with the developer. Yet,
if a developer is confronted with the prospect of negotiating individually with
each affected party-under the threat from each that a lawsuit could suspend
the project-then bargaining costs may become insurmountable.' 04
Furthermore, some environmentally motivated interest groups may have
ulterior motives to stop the project altogether, so direct negotiations with them
would inevitably prove to be fruitless. These dynamics could be considered
"negotiating externalities" since individuals have greater incentives to negotiate
individually, but individual negotiations may impose insurmountable obstacles
to siting a facility that would actually increase overall welfare. Individual
incentives alone, without the intervention of governance mechanisms to
facilitate negotiations, would lead to Pareto-inferior outcomes.105
Consequently, these externalities impose serious contracting hazards to siting
transactions.
2. Measurement Problems
A critical point of contention in siting negotiations is the impact the
proposed facility will have on adjacent natural and human environments.
Contracting around this issue requires that parties to the agreement (a)
understand what effects are likely, (b) are aware of safeguards available to
remedy these effects, and (c) can discern when these safeguards have failed.
Measurement problems, however, can introduce transaction hazards and hinder
bargaining from accomplishing these goals. 1°6 Many measurement problems
are traceable to a condition of impacted information: namely, when information
is asymmetrically distributed between parties and can be equalized only at great
cost.'0 7 Information can be similarly impacted if it is costly to apprise an arbiter
of the true information condition when a dispute arises among equally well-
informed parties.
In the context of solid and hazardous waste facilities, measurement
problems arise from the inability to effectively relate contractual performance
104 This is akin to a legally-created anticommons, in which each member of an adversely
affected neighborhood has the right to bring suit and thus the capacity to halt development. See Michael
A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV.
L. REv. 621 (1998).
105 This is true even factoring the environmental groups into the social-surplus equation. We
recognize that certain environmental groups would enjoy more utility if no facility were built at all, but
these preferences diverge from those belonging to the host community, who could be better off under
transfer payments and a credible agreement.
106 Yoram Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets, 25 J.L. & ECON. 27
(1982).
107 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 3.
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to outcomes. In the siting of waste facilities, the three conditions that would
enable contracts to internalize the costs to local residents-parties' knowledge
of a facility's future effects, available safeguards against those effects, and
signs the safeguards have failed-are likely to be absent (in varying degrees)
for two reasons. First, information is not symmetrically distributed. Developers
have much better information about the likely social, economic, and
environmental impacts of proposed facilities than do residents of prospective
host communities. Public officials and community representatives involved in
siting negotiations frequently complain that they lack sufficient information to
make informed decisions. There is also a general suspicion that the information
provided is selective at best and intentionally misleading at worst, meaning that
information asymmetry is exacerbated by unaligned incentives to share
information.
108
Second, the complexity and uncertainty associated with waste facilities
makes leveling the information playing field very costly and perhaps
impossible. Understanding and evaluating the risks these facilities may pose to
surrounding environments is a complicated process made more so by
significant scientific disagreement. 10 9 The general public is frequently unable to
evaluate for itself the likely effects of a proposed facility or to make sense of
the technical and often contradictory analyses of others. Even if one could
achieve a scientific consensus regarding a given facility's potential effects, long
latencies, uncertainty regarding causation, and the large number of potentially
liable parties would make it difficult to definitively link the activities of a waste
facility with a particular outcome.
One exacerbation of measurement problems that plagues NIMBYs is the
significant risk aversion-and the inability to insure against risk---exhibited by
individual homeowners affected by a NIMBY project. Even for projects that
are expected to improve land values, or for projects that promise adequate
compensation to adversely affected individuals, homeowners appropriately fear
that a project may detrimentally affect the value of their homes (even after
factoring in compensation), which for many families is their most valuable
possession and which can constitute the vast majority of a family's
nonretirement assets. As one economist put it, it is not the expected value of a
project that worries such homeowners, but rather the risk posed by the
significant variance in outcome. 10 Since the risk of such a potentially
devastating financial loss is uninsurable, residents are likely to mount
significant opposition even in the face of reasonable assurances against adverse
outcomes. This rational risk aversion is an important avenue through which
108 O'HARE ET AL., supra note 12, at 89-117; SUSSKIND & FIELD, supra note 67 at 115-16;
Bacow & Milkey, supra note 38, at 265-69, 302-05.
109 JOHN D. GRAHAM & JONATHAN BAERT WIENER, RISK VS. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN
PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1995).
110 See William A. Fischel, Why Are There NIMBYs?, 77 LAND ECON. 144,144-45 (2001).
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measurement, communication, and information asymmetry problems impede a
smooth siting process. I
For transactions that feature both impacted and asymmetric information, it
is difficult to describe fully and accurately the responsibilities of each party in
the contract ex ante and to assess whether these obligations have been fulfilled
ex post. Consequently, parties to the contract have opportunities to engage in
the strategic withholding of critical information or to engage in efforts to evade
performance. A developer, for example, might withhold information about a
project's adverse consequences or understate the probability of an adverse
event in order to minimize compensation payments necessary to secure the
support of a prospective host community. Likewise, host community residents
might file false claims against a facility in order to extract compensation or to
achieve desired changes in the facility's operations.1 2 Even if all parties
dutifully fulfill their contractual obligations, the mere possibility that each party
might act opportunistically gives negotiating partners reason to worry and to
distrust the bargaining process. In sum, the very nature of information critical
to siting waste facilities creates hazards that hinder parties from making
credible agreements and thus deter efficient bargaining.
3. Asset Specificity
A third contracting hazard with important organizational implications in
the siting process is asset specificity. This type of hazard arises because
constructing waste facilities requires investments in assets that are non-
redeployable, so developers will hesitate to begin a project before safeguards
can protect their investment.
Three types of asset specificity arise in this context. The first is the
traditional physical asset specificity common to the TCE literature."
3
Investments in plant equipment for waste disposal may have few alternative
uses, so local residents or other parties may identify opportunities to extract
quasi-rents' 14 by threatening legal intervention or other hold-ups. Second, for
several of these facilities, site specificity presents a key contractual hazard.
Hazardous and solid waste facilities are often sited in a particular region in
Ill For a more detailed examination of this argument, and the broader implications for local
government, see WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS (2001).
112 Aspects of environmental law make it easier for these superfluous suits to actually get to
court. For a discussion of the consequences of section 107(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act, under which liability for the release of a hazardous
substance is based on strict liability and requires no element of causation, see THOMAS F.P. SULLIVAN,
THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 225 (13th ed. 1995).
113 Klein et al., supra note 3.
114 A quasi-rent is a short-term economic gain that one party obtains by charging more than
the competitive price for a good. Hold-ups present opportunities for quasi-rents because the "held-up"
party risks having its investments lose their value and thus is willing to pay a premium to make good use
of those sunk investments. From the ex ante perspective, an investor would forgo making non-
redeployable investments if she detects the possibility of being held-up. Id. at 298-302.
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order to serve nearby local waste producers.' 5 Once an investment in a facility
is made, the developer is locked into a long-term commitment with particular
customers, and a "cheek-by-jowl" relationship ensues, much like those created
when coal-fired electric generation facilities are sited next to specific mines
from which most of their coal will be extracted. 16 In these cases, local interests
can attempt to capitalize on the inability of these facilities to easily relocate.
Protestors can move to block either the facility's operation or the flow of waste
needed for the facility to remain profitable. The possibilities of having their
investments held hostage are sufficient to drive developers to demand
preemptive and credible assurances during the early stages of negotiation.
A third type of asset specificity-one that has not previously been
mentioned in the TCE literature--could be described as legally induced asset
specificity. This asset specificity, which applies only to certain hazardous and
radioactive waste facilities, results from the peculiar nature of U.S.
environmental law. Under section 107(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), for example, the
current landowner is jointly and severally liable for environmental damages
caused by facilities on the land."17 This liability is imposed regardless of the
landowner's involvement in the handling of solid or hazardous substances on
the site and regardless of when such substances were deposited at the
facility.1 8 As a result, once the treatment and disposal of hazardous substances
has begun at a site, the site's owner will have difficulty finding new buyers
who are oblivious to the threat of liability, significantly reducing the value of
the property's next best use. 119 Unlike physical and site specificity, legally
induced specificity is more a function of the political environment-the
planned facility's location and legal backdrop-than of the nature of the facility
itself. Consequently, the degree to which it affects siting projects depends more
on the location and legal backdrop than on the nature of the facility.
Under each type of asset specificity, the scope of opportunism is
expanded. Because their investments have discretely lower value in alternative
applications, developers are effectively isolated from alternative trading
opportunities, which open the door to the extraction of quasi-rents. When asset
115 19 KIRK-OTHMER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY 175 (Jacqueline 1.
Kroschwitz ed., 4th ed. 1996) (citing "proximity to market" among important factors in selecting a
location for a waste facility).
116 See Paul L. Joskow, Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical
Evidence from Coal Markets, in CASE STUDIES IN CONTRACTING AND ORGANIZATION 104 (Scott E.
Masten ed., 1996); Paul Joskow, Vertical Integration and Long Term Contracts: The Case of Coal
Burning Electric Generation Plants, I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 33 (1985).
117 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-9675 (2000).
118 SULLIVAN, supra note 112, at 225.
119 See Barbara Ruben, Government Programs and Regulations Can Revitalize Abandoned
Urban Brownfields, in GARBAGE AND WASTE: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 167, 169-70 (Charles P.
Cozic ed., 1997), for a discussion of the difficulties CERCLA liability poses for transferring abandoned
sites of hazardous waste facilities.
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specificity is combined with the hazards posed by measurement difficulties and
negotiating externalities, governance mechanisms that facilitate exchange take
on added importance.
4. Government Opportunism
Another source of incompleteness in any resolution to site a NIMBY
project rests on the credibility of a political environment to enforce, and not
disturb, the agreement. For example, NIMBY opponents might demand
assurances from a local government to monitor a sited facility, provide a
neighborhood infrastructural or tax relief, or pledge to a future development
plan that would benefit the affected areas. Political leaders are quite likely to
make such commitments, but how can NIMBY opponents know government
officials will keep those promises? Indeed, how can they know those promises
will be kept by the officials' successors?
NIMBY opponents cannot demand assurances from government officials
like those they can demand by contract from developers and other private
entities. One might label this the curse of sovereignty-the essential inability
for political leaders to make credible commitments in agreements with private
citizens.1 20 The issue of credibility is particularly important regarding promises
made by local governments, for local governments are prohibited from entering
into binding contracts restricting use of the police power, making credible
commitments all but impossible.'
21
Moreover, the government's carte blanche to renege on agreements
imbues negotiations between developers and NIMBY opponents with further
uncertainty and severely limits a government's ability to assist development
projects. This is particularly unfortunate because governmental intervention
could be extremely useful in resolving NIMBY disputes. For example, a
government could assist negotiations directly by authorizing an agency to take
part in development plans or by acting as a guarantor to certain financial
considerations. A government might also bestow upon a private developer the
power of eminent domain or offer its police powers to the developer's agenda.
If any assistance a government gives can be promptly taken away, then
government actors are severely limited in their ability to intercede.
120 The credibility of political actors-specifically, the credibility of a government's pledge
to refrain from expropriating private investment-is of great interest to scholars studying the political
transaction costs of international investment. The seminal work in this area is Levy & Spiller, supra note
5. See also Witold J. Henisz, The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment, 16 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 334 (2000).
121 See OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 675-76 (2d
ed. 2001) (citing cases for the proposition that: "[A] local government cannot validly promise a private
party that governmental power will not be exercised in a particular way as to that party; such an
agreement clearly curtails the legislative or administrative discretion that citizens are entitled to have
from their government .... It seems that the public policy against any such restrictions on municipal
exercise of power is now so firmly established that everyone should be on guard against entering into
these contracts and that all relief on these agreements will universally be denied.").
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However, the likelihood of a particular municipality acting arbitrarily, and
thus the degree of uncertainty and risk that sovereignty causes, varies across
different polities. In some political regimes, power might be more centralized,
with fewer veto points or less heterogeneous constituencies. Alternatively,
some polities might have procedures or institutions in place that would hinder
government actors from engaging in conduct that might disrupt stated
development plans. Like legally induced asset specificity, the problem of
government opportunism varies not across NIMBY projects themselves, but
instead across the locations where NIMBY disputes occur.
In sum, that future government action could unsettle agreements is
realistic. When viewed ex ante, it presents a significant contractual hazard that
inhibits resolution of NIMBY disputes.
C. Governance Mechanisms
States have developed a diverse array of regulations to respond to the
NIMBY problem, many addressing both the different elements of the siting
process and the siting of different facilities. Consequently, a diverse assortment
of regulations is available for review.
Critical to the TCE conception of governance mechanisms is the notion
that institutions vary in their attributes, particularly along the dimensions of
incentive intensity, administrative controls, and adaptation performance.'
22
Governing institutions can be differentiated along a spectrum ranging from
markets (with high incentive intensity, low administrative control, and
autonomous adaptation) to hierarchies (with low incentive intensity, high
administrative control, and coordinated adaptation). Equally significant, this
spectrum includes numerous hybrid governing mechanisms that employ both
market and hierarchical elements. As was noted earlier, recent work by
Williamson and Dixit has likened regulation to a hybrid mode of governance123
that lies within the market-hierarchy spectrum. Moreover, regulations are not
restricted to only one organizational form but instead embody a diverse
collection of governing relationships.
Consistent with TCE terminology, some scholars have differentiated
between assorted regulations according to the degree of institutional
intervention they impose, i.e., how comparatively "market" or "hierarchical"
they are. These labels can be applied with traditional TCE distinctions: Market
regulation exhibits a greater degree of incentive intensity, less administrative
control, and more autonomous adaptation as compared to hierarchical
122 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 219-75. Transaction cost economics also
dimensionalizes governance according to contract law. Each of the regulatory mechanisms discussed
here falls under the same contract law regime, neoclassical contract law. Faced with the prospective
breakdown of relations, additional governance structures (such as government regulation) are instituted
to facilitate gap filling, dispute resolution and adaptation. Id. at 95-100.
123 DIXIT, supra note 93, at 1-36; WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 145-70.
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regulation. Such characterizations of regulation, for example, are akin to
distinctions drawn between incentive regulation, whereby government
intervention could be said to assist the operation of the market, even though
market mechanisms remain the primary forces that organize exchange, and
command and control regulation, whereby government intervention is more
direct and bureaucratic power is the primary force that organizes exchange.'
24
State siting regulations for waste facilities likewise occupy this spectrum of
variance, exhibiting both market and hierarchy attributes in varying degrees,
and they accordingly range from comparatively market-oriented regulations to
comparatively hierarchical regulations. Three broad categories of siting
regulation-information-enhancing, process-enhancing, and market-
substituting-lie along this market-hierarchy spectrum and deserve additional
discussion.
1. Information-Enhancing Regulations
The purpose of information-enhancing regulations is to mitigate the
hazards brought on by information and measurement problems. These
regulations are designed to facilitate a complete exchange of information
between negotiating parties and to force the disclosure of private information
when such information is deemed to have value for the opposing side. They
also imbue the exchange of information with greater credibility, since parties
are disclosing knowledge to comply with regulatory standards and not for
negotiation posturing.
These regulations are comparatively "market" oriented, since they are
intended to support or add structure to market interactions. Information-
enhancing regulations are designed to fully inform the market players or to alter
the incentives these parties face. Such regulations do not dictate how firms or
private parties should behave in a given instance, and the relevant exchange is
still controlled by the market players themselves. Three important examples of
information-enhancing regulations include:
Environmental Impact Statements (EIS), which are designed to increase
the availability of information concerning new projects and disclose how a
particular project will affect the surrounding natural and physical environment,
such as drinking water, air quality, and traffic. These statements are mandated
by several federal statutes, including the National Environmental Policy Act of
124 DAVID P. BARON, BUSINESS AND ITS ENVIRONMENT 251 (1993); see also MURRAY L.
WEIDENBAUM, BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 20-29 (7th ed. 2003)
(introducing theories of regulation and the rationales that "have been put forth to justify this type of
government intervention in the economy").
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1969, 125 and many states have enacted similar statutes that apply to additional
projects, including those that involve a state subsidy or permit.1 26
Determination of Need Statements, which require developers to provide a
statement detailing why a proposed facility is needed, what alternative sites
were considered, 127 and the justifications for picking a particular site.
Demand and Supply Forecasts, which may be part of a determination of
need statement, require that developers forecast the expected demand for a
facility's services and how the facility will meet that demand.
128
Although these information-enhancing regulations serve as vehicles for
information exchange, they are also common tools of opposition, serving to
delay construction of an undesired facility.' 29 In other words, for some
transactions, invocation of these regulations may reflect intractable negotiating
hazards instead of efforts to mitigate hazards. For such transactions,
information-enhancing regulations may be insufficient to bring about efficient
negotiation, and more hierarchical regulations may be required.
2. Process-Enhancing Regulations
Process-enhancing regulations are rules that affect the process by which
parties to a siting agreement negotiate. Because these regulations generally
entail added state involvement in shaping how negotiations take place, they are
more hierarchical than information-enhancing regulations. But primary
decision-making authority remains in the hands of the developer and the local
negotiating parties, so these regulations are nonetheless largely market-
oriented. Three prominent examples of this type of regulation are the following:
Formal Declaration of Parties, which create local negotiating committees
that represent parties affected by a proposed facility.' 30 The declarations are
designed to ensure comprehensive representation of local interests, and they
grant legal standing to a representative body authorized to negotiate with a
developer.13 ' They can mitigate negotiation externalities by precluding the
option of individual negotiations and forcing collective bargaining.
125 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370
(2000)) (requiring any federal action that significantly affects the human environment to be
accompanied by an impact statement).
126 In addition to providing information to parties in siting negotiations, EISs have also
become tools of opposition. EIS challenges are among the most effective means of delaying the
construction of an undesired facility. This view of EISs lends support to the positive political theory
view of regulation discussed in Part II.
127 E.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE 246-235-086(b) (2005); see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY SITING: A CRITICAL PROBLEM 7 (1980) (providing three guiding
principles for state siting programs, one of which is that "states should execute a technical evaluation of
all proposed sites before any single site is selected").
128 E.g., OR. ADMIN. R. 345-021-0010(n)(F) (2005).
129 RABE, supra note 10, at 154.
130 E.g., 990 MASS. CODE REGS. 8.01 (2005).
131 See id. at 8.06.
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Public Participation Measures, which are designed to allow broad public
involvement (beyond the local negotiating committee) in the siting process. 32
Specific public participation measures include public hearings, public
representatives on siting and oversight boards, and "public counsels,"
appointed by the state to represent the public in licensing and permitting
proceedings.
Negotiation and Arbitration Regulations, which provide added structure
to the negotiations between developers and community representatives by
specifying the timing of negotiations, penalties for refusing to negotiate in good
faith, and specific dispute resolution mechanisms (such as binding arbitration
before a state appointed arbitration board).
3. Market Substituting Regulations
The most hierarchical category of siting regulations is market substituting
regulations. Unlike information- and process-enhancing regulations, they
provide the state considerable power to preempt negotiations between
developers and the local siting committee or to overtum decisions made at the
local level. Regulatory measures in this category essentially substitute state
mandates for local decision-making; in TCE terminology, they are
characterized more by administrative controls than by incentive intensity. Three
important examples of market substituting regulations in this context are:
State Overrides, which provide a state agency with veto authority over
decisions made at the local level. 133 They serve as a powerful counter to
negotiations and to political action.
State Preemptive Authority, which permits certain state agencies to
preempt local government authority. Such authority permits agency planners to
ignore NIMBY opposition and make siting decisions pursuant to state policy
alone, regardless of local political preference.
State Inventories and Ownership, which authorize state officials to
inventory sites suitable for socially desirable facilities and to complete as much
of the review process as possible before a developer expresses interest. The
goal is to complete a significant part of the siting process without provoking
local opposition, thus protecting a developer from a political fight. In a few
states, officials not only review and inventory acceptable locations but also
132 See, e.g., 25 PA. CODE §§ 24.1-24.4 (2005).
133 DAVID MORELL & CHRISTOPHER MAGORIAN, SITING HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES:
LOCAL OPPOSITION AND THE MYTH OF PREEMPTION 92-97 (1982); O'HARE ET AL., supra note 12, at 57.
Exercising these regulations does not necessarily remove the developer's incentive to negotiate with the
host community. These regulations certainly raise the developer's reservation option, and consequently
may change the content of these negotiations, but developers may still find value in entering into
negotiations with community leaders (thus giving concurrent roles to other, less hierarchical
regulations).
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purchase the properties. Developers then enter into negotiations with the state
in order to purchase the land and begin construction.
1 34
To summarize, the hazards inherent in siting solid and hazardous waste
facilities have led to the development of a host of regulatory mechanisms. Their
primary purpose is to enhance cooperation among all parties affected in
building and locating these socially beneficial but locally undesirable facilities.
They can be described as fitting within information-enhancing, process-
enhancing, or market-substituting categories, each of which, under a TCE
analysis, fits into a market-hierarchy spectrum: Market-substituting regulations
are the most hierarchical, information-enhancing regulations are the most
market-oriented, and process-enhancing regulations exhibit intermediate
qualities.
D. Discriminating Alignment
The fundamental hypothesis of TCE is that "transactions which differ in
their attributes [are aligned] with governance structures (which differ in their
costs and competencies) in a discriminating (mainly transaction-cost-
economizing) way."' 35 With respect to waste facilities, TCE predicts that siting
transactions, whose attributes pose various types and degrees of hazards, should
be aligned with regulatory mechanisms that possess the mix of market and
hierarchy features that can best remedy these hazards.
The four predominant types of solid and hazardous waste facilities are
solid waste landfills, solid waste incinerators, hazardous waste storage and
treatment facilities, and hazardous waste disposal facilities. Siting each
represents a unique transaction and poses its own hazards to the contractual
relationship between the developer and the host community (e.g., the problems
and issues that arise in relation to siting a landfill are different from those
involved in siting a hazardous waste site).' 36 These hazards, including
negotiation externalities, measurement problems, asset specificity, and
government opportunism, differ across siting transactions.
We reviewed sources that describe the technical aspects of these various
types of facilities, 37 and we attempt to quantify 138 each of the individual
134 It is important to point out that the use of state inventories does not imply that the local
community is helpless to oppose undesirable facilities. Rather, these measures simply remove an
important piece of the siting process from local control. Often overrides and inventories are combined
with some form of negotiation between the developer and the local community.
135 WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 46-47.
136 See Glenn Blomquist, The Effect of Electric Utility Power Plant Location on Area
Property Value, 50 LAND ECON. 97, 100 (1974) (discussing the effect of power plants on property value,
using the "rather special instance" of a Chicago plant as the "sole disamenity" in the community).
137 E.g., KIRK-OTHMER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY, supra note 115; A.
Streeter, Pittston-Eastport: An Energy Impacts Evaluation, in NUCLEAR ENERGY FACILITIES AND
PUBLIC CONFLICT: THREE CASE STUDIES (Judah L. Rose ed., 1979). Notes from a colleague's visits to
solid and hazardous waste sites taken between January and March 1995 were also consulted.
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hazards discussed above involved in the siting of each facility. First, siting a
facility requires a developer to negotiate with a collective of different parties,
so each project will experience negotiating externalities.' 39 Second, some
contractual hazards, such as government opportunism, vary more by
transactional setting than by individual project, though particularly
controversial projects, such as hazardous waste disposal facilities, might be
more likely to invite political intervention than other projects. In any event,
even after devising regulatory policy to accommodate for differences between
waste facilities, the optimal regulatory regime will also depend on the legal and
political setting.
Alternative waste facilities exhibit more important variation in the two
other hazards discussed above: measurement problems and asset specificity.
Solid waste landfills present measurement problems in that they pose threats of
odor, seepage into water systems, and other environmental dangers; 140 but
landfills have developed reliable technologies to deal with hazardous materials
to substantially reduce risks to human health and the environment. 141 In
addition, those risks that do exist can be assuaged with fairly simple
technologies, and the transparency of activities performed at landfills makes
monitoring relatively simple. 142 By contrast, solid waste incinerators pose a
greater degree of measurement problems since they produce air pollutants of
varying dangers across large geographic regions. But with appropriate
technology (which, incidentally, also can be hard to measure), air discharges
from these facilities can be monitored; moreover, like landfill deposits, solid
waste incinerators deal mostly with non-hazardous materials. The greatest
measurement problems are posed by hazardous waste disposal facilities. These
dispose of materials that genuinely pose environmental threats and pose those
threats through a variety of media--e.g., air, water, and ground-that are hard
to monitor and detect. 143 In addition, long latencies between a facility's actions
138 We should emphasize that these are only preliminary estimates of hazards, are largely
comprised of educated inferences from a variety of sources, and that therefore the actual challenges to
site the facilities we mention might be quite different. However, our contribution is not dependent on the
accuracy of these estimates but instead rests on the overall TCE-motivated methodology. We present a
template with which policymakers can tailor regulatory schemes to address individual NIMBY
challenges, and while useful application of the template relies on estimating contractual hazards
accurately, our estimates are designed chiefly to provide only an illustration of our model.
139 Externalities include a facility's impact on future generations, who (though certainly
difficult to organize) may be represented in some capacity by certain government agencies. For example,
a state agency might intervene in negotiations between a community and a developer to protect future
interests.
140 OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, FACING AMERICA'S TRASH: WHAT NEXT FOR MUNICIPAL
SOLID WASTE? 284-89 (1989) (describing the assorted environmental and health effects imposed by
landfills).
141 Id. at 276-84.
142 See id.
143 See, e.g., JAMES G. ABERT, RESOURCE RECOVERY GUIDE 431 (1983) (describing an
Oceanside, N.Y. plant's wastage problem that extended over several years and the subsequent need to
visit similarly-situated European plants for a "satisfactory explanation").
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(e.g., an accidental spill) and health or environmental outcomes can make the
impact of these facilities largely uncertain and difficult to prove.
Asset specificity plays a role in each of these facilities as well. Landfills
are generally built to service specific customers in the region and are thus site
specific, but their physical asset specificity is relatively low because ultimately
they are covered and made into parks or parking lots or are sold for industrial
development. Physical asset investments in solid waste incinerators are also
typically generic and can, with relatively little difficulty, be redeployed for
alternative uses. Hazardous waste storage and treatment facilities contain both
physical asset and site specificity, probably similar to that of landfills and
incinerators. Finally, hazardous waste disposal facilities contain the greatest
asset specificity since rigorous zoning requirements impose severe limitations
as to where these may be sited, and hazardous materials preclude them from
being employed for an alternative use.
In sum, and as reflected in Table 1, we approximate that landfills have
low measurement hazards and moderate asset specificity, solid waste
incinerators have moderate measurement hazards and moderate asset
specificity, hazardous waste storage and treatment facilities have high
measurement problems and moderate asset specificity, and hazardous waste
disposal facilities have high measurement problems and high asset specificity.
Table 1
Type of WEF Negotiation Measurement Asset Government










Waste Disposal ++ +++ ++ ++
Facilities
Note: + / -+ / +++ denotes the severity that the given hazard poses on the individual waste
facility.
Figure 2 then translates the data from Table 1 into TCE-motivated
hypotheses. The X-axis reflects a project's asset specificity and the Y-axis
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reflects its measurement problems, so the area from the origin indicates the
cumulative contracting hazards created by siting each type of waste facility.
144
Since the discriminating alignment hypothesis posits that transactions posing
greater hazards will require additional governance mechanisms, the diagonal
lines representing the alternative regulatory regimes move farther from the
origin in accordance with their respective locations along a market-hierarchy
spectrum. This TCE model suggests that landfills and solid waste incinerators
will require fewer hierarchical regulations than will hazardous waste storage
and treatment or disposal facilities in order to achieve efficient outcomes.
Figure 2 summarizes these predictions and illustrates how increasing hazards
(along either the X- or Y-axis) should prompt increasingly hierarchical
governance mechanisms. 1
45






144 Because negotiating externalities and the threat of political opportunism exist (with
relatively little variation) for each type of facility, and because rudimentary graphical illustrations permit
the depiction of only two dimensions, these two categories of contracting hazards are excluded from
Figure 2.
145 Note that Figure 2 implicitly assumes that the discussed contractual hazards have a certain
additive quality to them. In other words, it suggests that finding the optimal regulatory governance
device requires determining the cumulative hazards, whatever the source. Consequently, the regulatory
regime most appropriate for a project that imposes high measurement costs but low asset specificity
would also be most appropriate for a project with low measurement costs and high asset specificity.
While we think this additive quality is a likely feature of siting noxious facilities, it by no means is a
necessary feature. Consequently, Figure 2 is to be read as a suggestive heuristic through which one can
understand when different regulatory devices might be appropriate. Though the most effective approach,
as has been stated throughout this paper, is to tailor a specialized regulatory process for each project
individually, it is useful to have a generalized understanding of how regulatory regimes can match
different projects.
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This comparison of alternative regulatory mechanisms suggests a general
approach to devising regulatory policy for siting facilities. According to Figure
2, the siting processes for landfills and incinerators require information-
enhancing and process-enhancing regulations, but additional process-enhancing
regulation is undesirable. This suggests that employing preemptive or market-
substituting regulations for these facilities would constitute overregulation and
would generate sub-optimal policy outcomes. While these facilities might still
be sited successfully under an overregulated regime, the locations for such
facilities and the associated compensation schemes, if any, would be less able
to match social preferences than would market-enhancing or similar
regulations. Alternatively, siting treatment, storage, and disposal facilities for
hazardous waste requires more regulatory support than siting landfills; thus,
process enhancing and market substituting regulations are required. Though
such a regulatory regime might not solicit neighborhood participation and its
associated benefits, failure to provide adequate regulatory support could lead to
a failure to site socially desirable facilities altogether.
Certainly, our hypotheses are not limited to two dimensions, and the
exercise of aggregating the cumulative hazards associated with a certain
transaction can incorporate additional hazards into the analysis. For example,
one can imagine Figure 2 in three dimensions (which would appear as a
pyramid on its side) that measures three different hazards along axes X, Y, and
Z and places increasingly hierarchical regulations in the three-dimensional
spaces that expand away from the origin. Policy recommendations would then
follow, just as it did in Figure 2, from a plotting of the individual waste
facilities in the three-dimensional space. The core lesson remains the same:
This transaction cost approach produces a concrete template for a flexible
regulatory policy. Given the qualities of a certain facility, this approach reveals
the preferred regulatory tools to site that facility.
IV. Preliminary Evidence
This paper's primary purpose is to develop a TCE approach to
understanding siting regulations. While a formal empirical test of the
predictions developed here is beyond this Article's scope, the selected case
studies below illustrate how the regulatory governance mechanisms discussed
here can support (or, when either absent or inadequately designed for the nature
of the intended transactions, fail to support) the siting of socially desirable
facilities. It should be emphasized that our model does not assume ex post
efficiency. In other words, some regulations, whether from poor policy making
or other limited judgments, are actually inappropriately aligned with the
transactions they are intended to govern. Although the difficulties in siting
waste facilities have seriously impeded necessary projects for approximately
thirty years, few states have experimented with process-enhancing regulations
that facilitate siting negotiations, and competitive forces, if any, are insufficient
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to drive optimal regulatory outcomes. This is partly because the political
process is not a market with free entry, and feedback mechanisms to address
inefficient policies are rarely effective. For this reason, regulatory
"misalignments" are presumably endemic in state regulatory regimes and will
lead to suboptimal results. Examining both regulatory successes and failures is
instructive as to how regulatory devices can govern particular economic
activity in a transaction-cost-minimizing way.
A. Three Case Studies
Relying on case studies inherently restricts the analysis to small sample
sizes, which makes it more difficult to support generalizations about the TCE
hypothesis. Nonetheless, a careful analysis of specific instances where siting
certain waste facilities encountered political opposition can serve some
worthwhile purposes. First, such an analysis illuminates the microanalytic
dimensions of the siting process and reveals the specific hazards of an
individual transaction: what concerns local residents, how concerns translate
into political pressures, and how negotiations between conflicting parties
progress (or fail to progress). Second, it illustrates the role regulation plays to
support the transactions and the consequences that ensue when adequate
regulation is absent. And third, an examination of specific disputes in different
municipalities introduces variation in both the type of transaction and the
nature of the regulatory regime. The three case studies below each present a
different pairing of a NIMBY project with a governance mechanism: The first
is an effort to site a solid waste incinerator under a regime of only information-
enhancing regulations; the second is a landfill project under a regime of
information-enhancing and process-enhancing regulations; and the third is a
hazardous waste facility being sited under information-enhancing and process-
enhancing regulations. The success of the second and the failures of the first
and third lends support to our recommendations for a flexible regulatory policy
that matches siting processes appropriately with individual projects.
1. Philadelphia 1988
Throughout the late 1980s, landfills were being closed across the
Northeast, and major urban centers were facing waste disposal crises. 146 By
146 The late 1980s and early 1990s, especially, was a time when the attention of the media
and of major policymakers was focused on a mounting municipal solid waste crisis. See NATURAL RES.
DEF. COUNCIL, Too GOOD To THROW AWAY: RECYCLING'S PROVEN RECORD, ch. 4 (1997), available
at http://www.nrdc.org/cities/recyclingrecyc/chap4.asp ("In 1986, . . . more than two hundred articles
appeared in major newspapers and magazines throughout the United States quoting local public works
officials throughout the country who found that polluting landfills, rising waste disposal costs, and fights
over dangerous waste incinerators were among the two or three greatest public-policy problems they had
to deal with."); George J. Church at al., Garbage, Garbage Everywhere, TIME, Sept. 5, 1988, at 81;
Peter S. Menell, An Economic Assessment of Market-Based Approaches to Regulating the Municipal
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1988, Philadelphia, perhaps more than any other city, was facing a severe
disposal crisis. Disposal costs per ton had nearly tripled since 1983,147 and low
capacity in nearby landfills forced the city to dump much of its solid waste in
sites as far away as Columbus, Ohio.148 The city frantically searched for new
sites. One proposal tried to persuade the city of Houston to accept some of
Philadelphia's solid waste, other attempts propositioned sites in Virginia, South
Carolina, and Georgia.' 49 Meanwhile, a barge named The Khian Sea carrying
14,000 tons of Philadelphia's waste had been roaming the seas, searching for a
dumping site, for nearly two years.
150
Some cities began to rely increasingly on trash incinerators, which could
reduce the volume of solid waste by as much as 90%.151 Philadelphia at the
time had two operating trash incinerators, but they operated on outdated
technology, were known environmental hazards, and had prompted twenty
years of closure demands.' 52 As Mayor W. Wilson Goode began his second
term in January 1988, his administration proposed constructing a new "trash-to-
steam" facility that would replace the two older incinerators. The proposal was
designed to address the waste disposal crisis while bringing better, more
environment-friendly technology to trash disposal. Deputy Mayor Marjorie
Adler, testifying on April 13, 1988 before the Philadelphia City Council,
argued that the new trash incinerator would stabilize the city's long-term trash
disposal costs by reducing its dependence on expensive landfills while
minimizing the environmental and health costs associated with trash
incineration. 153 In addressing these health concerns, the administration cited a
panel of medical experts who determined that the health effect of emissions
from the proposed plant would be equal to "one person smoking two cigarettes
or drinking two Diet Cokes in a lifetime.' 54
The trash-to-steam proposal would seem to generate an increase in overall
surplus, making it potentially Pareto improving. It would have reduced overall
incinerator emissions while disposing of more solid waste and reducing
expenses on waste disposal. Indeed, one poll showed that most Philadelphians
favored the project for the new incinerator, and support was as high as 70% in
Solid Waste Stream (Boalt Working Papers in Pub. Law, Paper No. 126, 2004). It therefore is no
surprise that all three case studies occurred within this time period.
147 Faye Rice, Where Will We PutAll That Garbage?, FORTUNE, Apr. 11, 1988, at 96, 96.
148 Houston Fights Proposal To Import Philadelphia Trash, REUTERS, Feb. 3, 1988, LEXIS-
NEXIS Academic Universe.
149 William K. Stevens, Trash Disposal Problem Besieging Philadelphia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
20, 1988, at 7.
150 Karen Tumulty, Trash Disposal Crisis: No Dumping (There's No More Dump), L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 1988, at 4.
151 Id.
152 Rice, supra note 147, at 98.
153 Robin Clark, It Was Familiar Opposition to a Familiar Proposal, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr.
14, 1988, at B7.
154 Stevens, supra note 149.
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many neighborhoods.' 55 But the siting process devolved into a classic NIMBY
political battle as a vocal Trash-to-Steam Alternative Coalition emerged from
the South Philadelphia neighborhood near where the proposed facility would be
sited. The coalition flexed its political muscle before city council and brought a
"foot-stomping, sign-waving" gang of citizens to the Council's hearings.
56
They mounted what one administration official called "as fierce opposition as
anyone could imagine."'
' 57
Because a bond issue was required to raise the necessary capital funds, the
project needed City Council approval. Without the involvement of an expedited
regulatory siting mechanism, the project had to pass through the open political
process. Consequently, as the administration attempted to enter into
negotiations with interested parties, local opposition rounded up Council
members to block the proposal. One of South Philadelphia's advocates
continued to rail against the proposal, threatening "to fight this thing until I'm
not here anymore," and other members joined suit.' 58 The opposition expressed
itself through adamant neighborhood groups, grandstanding politicians, and
public interest representatives. The diversity of interests involved in the
opposition created further difficulties for the administration to negotiate a
settlement, making coordinated bargaining substantially more difficult, and
talks continued fruitlessly into the summer. Mayor Goode eventually resigned
to call the plan "dead" on July 27, 1988, and bitterly noted that residents would
consequently face higher trash disposal bills.
159
Why was the administration unable to mobilize its majority support and
reach a negotiated settlement with the South Philadelphia residents? Much of
the answer lies in the hazards inherent in siting waste incinerators. Jerome
Balter, a spokesperson for opponents of the project, "accused administration
officials of misrepresenting the plant's safety standards."' 160 Other opponents
cited many other potentially harmful effects incinerators may cause-airborne
dioxins, particulates, and ash--despite the noted improvements in incinerator
technology. As one industry expert observed, "it's very clear that the
technologies for new plants are a lot better, but it always comes down to a
value judgment. Building up public confidence is a very critical factor. ' 1 In
short, the complexity of the information, or the impacted nature of the
information, presented contracting hazards in the negotiations and impeded
efficient bargaining. These hazards were further complicated by negotiating
155 Trash: The Boomerang's Back, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 18, 1988, at A14.
156 Clark, supra note 153.
157 Tumulty, supra note 150.
158 Clark, supra note 153.
159 Philadelphia Mayor: Trash-to-Steam Plan Dead, U.P.I., Aug. 27, 1988, LEXIS-NEXIS
Academic Universe.
160 Clark, supra note 153.
161 Tumulty, supra note 150; see also RABE, supra note 10, at 107 (attributing successful
siting in Greensboro, North Carolina, to "early and extensive public participation").
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externalities, which impeded coordinated negotiation and any serious attempt to
address specific concerns.
The Philadelphia case is one in which a new incinerator was likely to be
Pareto improving, but contracting difficulties caused the proposal to fall victim
to the political process. Had a more hierarchical governance mechanism
supported the siting process, such as that used four years later in Wisconsin,
Philadelphia might have been able to address its waste disposal crisis with a
new incinerator.
2. Dane County, Wisconsin, 1992
Though the Madison, Wisconsin metropolitan area was not experiencing a
waste disposal crisis quite like that of Philadelphia, the Wisconsin Department
of Natural Resources (DNR) forecasted that municipalities in Dane and
surrounding counties "would need new landfill space soon.",162 In response to
anticipated rising demand, Browning-Ferris Industries (BFI) proposed to
expand its Madison-Prarie landfill from twenty-two to forty-four acres and to
accept municipal waste in addition to the industrial waste it then received.
63
Opposition immediately emerged. Local residents feared traffic
congestion, odor, and damage to local enterprise. Further worries came from
the nearby Dane County Regional Airport, which feared that the landfill would
attract additional birds that would be a threat to planes using their runways.64
The most vocal opponent was American Family Insurance (American Family),
whose corporate headquarters were 4,700 feet from the planned expansion.
American Family sued BFI and organized protests at the Wisconsin State
Capitol. 165
The DNR issued an environmental impact statement nonetheless and
declared the proposed expansion to be safe. 166 Yet this did little to allay
opponents' fears. Citizens first argued that the DNR's report was incomplete
since it did not consider the "economic and social impact the larger landfill
would have on the nearby community."'167 In addition, American Family
disputed the results of the DNR study, arguing it overlooked the severity of
contamination caused by a nearby landfill that would be exacerbated by the
expansion; BFI countered that new technologies in lining landfills would
162 Landfill Expansion Approved; Opponents To Continue Fight, WIS. ST. J., Feb. 8, 1992, at
IA.
163 Bill Whittaker, American Family Rips Mad-Prairie Plan, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison,
Wis.), Mar. 13, 1992, at 3A.
164 Joel Broadway, Landfill Foes Air Worries, WIS. ST. J., Mar. 14, 1992, at lB.
165 Landfill Foes Will Protest at Capitol, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Mar. 12, 1992, at
3A.
166 Matt Pommer, DNR Calls Madison Prairie Landfill Safe, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison,
Wis.), Feb. 7, 1992, at 3A.
167 Whittaker, supra note 163.
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preclude seepage and consequent contamination of local groundwater. 168 As
opposition grew throughout the spring, the DNR eventually bowed to public
pressure and released a second study in June 1992 admitting that the landfill
may impose some environmental and economic costs that warrant concern.'
69
By July, little progress had been made. Despite the region's growing need
for waste disposal, a vocal opposition had organized and vowed to fight the
project. Multiple parties opposed the landfill expansion and mounted individual
challenges to block its approval, creating negotiating externalities that would
have complicated any effort to enter into bargaining. 170  Furthermore,
environmental impact statements, designed to facilitate the flow of information
between BFI and local residents, did little to clarify the landfill's effects and
reduce measurement problems. 171 Multiple hazards seemed to preclude
efficient bargaining, and one might have anticipated a stalemate similar to what
occurred in Philadelphia.
However, Wisconsin in 1981 instituted new siting procedures, consisting
primarily of information- and process-enhancing regulations, aimed to
overcome the NIMBY problem.172 First, the landfill siting process mandated
the establishment of a "local committee" of affected municipalities to represent
interested parties. This committee was to be the authorized representative for
local interests and the exclusive negotiating partner with the developer. Thus,
regulations mandating a local committee precluded opportunities to shirk from
negotiations and so minimize negotiating externalities. Second, the landfill
siting process administered the negotiations between parties and required them
to bargain in good faith or otherwise face binding arbitration or other
undesirable consequences.1 73 To facilitate BFI's negotiations with the local
committee, the Municipal Waste Siting Board, which supervised the
negotiations, scheduled public hearings that resembled a court trial in that
parties were subjected to scrutiny by one another and by state environmental
officials. The hearing, scheduled for mid-fall and to last several weeks,
provided an impetus to all parties involved to enter into rigorous negotiations to
reach a settlement.17
4
168 Bill Whittaker, Foes Cite Toxins by Dump, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Mar. 26,
1992, at 3A.
169 Mike Ivey, DNR Rethinks Landfill Expansion, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), June 30,
1992, at 3A.
170 Joel Broadway, Trash Handler Alters Landfill Plans, WIS. ST. J., Oct. 13, 1992, at 3D;
Mike Ivey, Landfill Firm Rips State About-Face, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), July 2, 1992, at 3A.
171 Ivey, supra note 170; see also Pat Schneider, County Wants Landfill Impact Reviewed,
CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), July 23, 1992, at 3A.
172 Peter J. Ruud & Dean M. Werner, Wisconsin's Landfill Negotiation/Arbitration Statute,
Wisc. BAR BULL., Nov. 1985, at 17, 17.
173 Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, Wisconsin's Landfill Siting Process,
http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/aw/wm/solid/landfill/siting.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2005).
174 Ivey, supra note 170.
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In mid-October of 1992, both BFI and American Family made substantial
concessions and pushed negotiations toward fruitful results.' 75 On February 4,
1993, a creative agreement was finalized. BFI would expand the landfill but
only to receive additional industrial waste, thereby not accepting the municipal
waste that would attract birds that might endanger the local airport. BFI would
further pledge to not seek to expand the landfill, to "limit the number of daily
truck trips" and the landfill's height, and to "install berms and implement other
landscaping to minimize the visual and aesthetic impact of the site." BFI would
also establish a 'neighbor to neighbor' group consisting of members from BFI,
American Family, and other interested parties to discuss additional concerns of
nearby residents.' 76 Thus, the agreement compromised on environmental,
economic, and monitoring issues while still alleviating the region's need for
solid waste disposal.
In sum, although numerous elements of the siting transaction might have
blocked a final agreement, the siting regulatory process mitigated contracting
hazards and created a process wherein bargaining led to a final resolution. The
Wisconsin regulations are notable in that they employed both market and
hierarchical elements. They intervened with information- and process-
enhancing regulations that directed how parties may proceed, but they allowed
the resolution to arrive chiefly through market-oriented negotiations. According
to the TCE discriminating alignment hypothesis, this institutional arrangement
is comparatively optimal for some transactions-like landfills-in which
contracting hazards are moderate, but it may not be effective in supporting
transactions with greater hazards, as the Massachusetts case illustrates below.
3. Massachusetts 1990
In 1980, Massachusetts passed regulations' 77 that instituted a siting
process similar to Wisconsin's, implementing information- and process-
enhancing regulations designed to force negotiated settlements between
developers and local committees. The Massachusetts law, however, extended to
siting hazardous waste facilities in addition to landfills and consequently
exhibited very little success. In the first twelve years after the law came into
force, five proposals for hazardous waste facilities were offered and none began
construction.
Examining the Clean Harbors proposal and its aftermath can illuminate
how the negotiation-based siting process failed in Massachusetts. 178 In May
175 Mike Ivey, Landfill Won't Take Municipal Waste, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Oct.
12, 1992, at 3A.
176 Mike Ivey, Madison-Prairie Landfill Deal To Relieve Rodefeld, CAPITAL TIMES
(Madison, Wis.), Oct. 13, 1992, at 3A.
177 990 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.01 to 16.03 (2005) (implementing the Massachusetts Hazardous
Waste Facility Siting Act).
178 See O'Hare & Sanderson, supra note 35, at 369-70, for the Clean Harbors case study.
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1987, Clean Harbors filed its notice of intent to expand its existing hazardous
waste transfer station in a highly industrialized section of Braintree, near
Boston. The incinerator would destroy some waste on-site rather than transport
it to other facilities as far away as Alabama and Arizona, thus saving significant
hauling and disposal costs. In October 1987, in accordance with the siting
procedures, the proposal was deemed "feasible and deserving" by the state
regulators, and a local committee was formed by nearby municipalities to enter
into siting negotiations.
The process continued as planned though the following year, with Clean
Harbors completing its initial environmental surveys and satisfying its
regulatory obligations. But in September 1989, the local committee decided to
withdraw altogether from negotiations with Clean Harbors. So although Clean
Harbors continued to receive approval from the state's environmental
regulators and advance through the regulatory process, the local committee
refused to participate in negotiations and instead remained organized to fight
the project in the political arena. Gradually, the state politicians responded to
local residents' protests. First, the Secretary of Environmental Affairs required
Clean Harbors to submit a supplemental environmental impact statement (here
likely used as a delay tactic and not as a device to facilitate information
exchange) and later to request permission from additional state agencies.
Meanwhile, as the review process slowed during the spring and summer of
1990, local residents solicited Massachusetts' gubernatorial candidates to
oppose the plan. By September, all five did. Later that month, additional dissent
came from state agencies, and the state's Site Safety Council, which had twice
before approved the proposed facility, ruled that the project was no longer
"feasible and deserving" of state support. Clean Harbors then saw it was losing
the political battle and decided not to appeal the decision, ending its effort to
expand its facility without ever meeting to negotiate with the local committee.
Why did the negotiation-based process work for a landfill in Wisconsin
but not for a hazardous waste incinerator in Massachusetts? According to
O'Hare & Sanderson,
[the project failed] because many of the site's neighbors did not believe it could
lead to an outcome acceptable to them; partly because the state's political
leadership gave neighbors, and the developer, no reason to believe it would
protect the siting process or the case for hazardous waste facilities itself from
localized attack; and partly because the neighbors simply could not understand
the health issues and were at best ill-served by the state agencies concerned with
them. 
179
This evaluation provides two explanations for the projects failure: First, the
process did not ensure a credible commitment to either the developer or the
residents that an agreement would be in their interest, or, in other words, there
was inadequate governance supporting the transaction. And second, the nature
179 Id. at 369-70.
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of the information was too complex and impacted to make efficient bargaining
possible. Siting Wisconsin's landfill may have introduced some measurement
hazards and other contracting problems, but siting the hazardous waste facility
near Boston created far greater measurement problems and gave rise to greater
opposition. The market-oriented regulations broke down because coordinated
negotiation could not credibly support a transaction with excessive hazards.
This observation is consistent with TCE theory, since transactions laden with
such hazards require more hierarchical governance.
The three case studies together offer preliminary evidence and some
interesting insights into the TCE approach to siting regulations. Since siting
waste facilities involve contracting hazards, some kind of governance
mechanism is required to support the transaction. The Philadelphia case study
illustrates how an attempt to site an incinerator with only information-
enhancing regulations led to failure. Alternatively, Wisconsin's information-
and process-enhancing regulation provided sufficient institutional intervention
and governance to support negotiations and allowed the project to proceed
under primarily market-based processes. This regulatory regime, however,
proved to be appropriate for only certain types of transactions. The same
regulations failed in Massachusetts when applied to facilitate siting a project
that was hampered by greater hazards. According to the TCE discriminating
alignment hypothesis, a more hierarchical governance mechanism would be
required for hazardous waste facilities.
V. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to employ transaction cost economics to
propose a policy strategy for regulating the siting of solid and hazardous waste
facilities. Unlike existing approaches to the NIMBY problem, which either
require negotiations over compensation or reject community participation
altogether, this paper develops a model for flexible regulatory policies. The
model's foundation is a theoretical framework for the underlying sources of the
NIMBY problem and the appropriate regulatory solutions. Understanding
NIMBY disputes as a contracting problem permits utilizing a TCE framework,
which systematically tailors regulatory solutions to the assorted political
challenges that arise in siting different noxious facilities. The TCE framework
identifies the contracting problems inherent in siting such facilities, evaluates
the costs and competencies of various regulatory regimes, and matches the two
so as to minimize transaction costs.
The result presents an attractive alternative to current regulatory failures.
Forceful regulatory interventions that dictate policy outcomes or require
negotiations-to-compensate schemes, despite winning the sympathies of those
exasperated with recurring NIMBY impasses, fail to harness the benefits of
market incentives and bargaining. Regulatory schemes that allow for
community participation, creative problem-solving, and effective negotiation
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can, as the Dane County experience illustrates, generate siting agreements that
are far superior to what a developer or state planner would order unilaterally.
However, regulatory schemes that rely entirely on compensation systems, such
as the Massachusetts system, will sometimes be unable to overcome local
resistance to siting socially necessary noxious facilities. In short, this flexible
approach would avoid the pitfalls of overregulation while providing the
regulatory force necessary to overcome NIMBY opposition. Equally important,
such a flexible system redeems the opportunity for community participation to
improve siting noxious facilities and thus adds significant value to a potentially
intractable problem. Recognizing the limitations of creative compensation-
based regulations reveals when those regulations can succeed, which is
increasingly necessary in the wake of intense skepticism towards compensation
schemes. 1
80
Moreover, the benefits of employing this TCE model to regulatory
challenges extend beyond the efficient siting of NIMBY projects. This template
readily applies to any public policy challenge in which public regulations are in
a position to mediate a dispute involving two or more parties. Under the
rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), federal
agencies are frequently required to enact policy that mediates conflicts between
interested parties. 18' Notable examples include disputes between
environmentalists and polluters over emission rates, Is2  between rival
broadcasters over frequency allocations, 183 and between food producers and
scientific or consumer groups over safety standards.' 84 Often these same rules
govem disputes between private parties and other government agencies. 85 On
their face, these disputes are no different from NIMBY conflicts between
communities and developers or planners.
Moreover, modem administrative law has at its disposal a menu of
regulatory devices. Much like state regulators that oversee siting noxious
facilities, federal agencies are subject to a variety of regulatory procedures that
guide them through disputes over rulemaking policy. 186 Sections 556 and 557
of the APA bind agencies to formal rulemaking proceedings that mandate
public hearings, 117 § 553(b) and (c) of the APA provide for informal
180 See Munton, supra note 9, at 16-17 (noting the perception of "fierce critics" that
compensation schemes are counterproductive to resolving NIMBY disputes); KAHAN, supra note 20, at
4 ("Indeed, there is evidence that compensation schemes at least sometimes make the NIMBY problem
worse").
181 Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2000)); see also Morrison, supra note 28.
182 See, e.g., Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1978).
183 See, e.g., Nat'l Black Media Coal. v. FCC, 791 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1986).
184 See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
185 One classic example is disputes between non-profits and the Internal Revenue Service,
see, e.g., Am. Med. Ass'n v. United States, 887 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1989).
186 See Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463 (1992).
187 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (2000).
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rulemaking procedures for agencies to implement notice-and-comment
rulemaking, 188 and § 552 permits agencies to disseminate interpretive rules or
statements of policy with only minimal procedural requirements.' 89 These
assorted rulemaking procedures have been dubbed "more formal rulemaking,"
"informal rulemaking," and "yet-more-informal rulemaking," respectively, 190
and they fit easily into the market-hierarchy spectrum of regulatory devices
developed here for siting regulations.' 9' The lessons from this article suggest
that the nature of the underlying dispute should determine which of these
alternative regulatory tools are optimal.
Although we leave a complete transaction cost analysis of the APA for
future research, and although the same analysis would be applicable to states
that have their own Administrative Procedure Acts,' 92 this Article's major
contribution is not its specific policy recommendations, but rather, its
development of a broadly applicable template to chart regulatory reform. We
believe our transaction cost model of regulation can inform any policy dispute
in which public entities must mediate between opposing parties, and that the
theory of the firm will continue to serve far-reaching academic and policy
objectives that are well beyond Coase's original formulation.
188 Id. § 553(b)-(c).
189 Id. § 552; see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
190 See generally PETER L. STRAUSS, ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
291-400 (9th ed. 1995).
191 See supra Section III.C.
192 See Rui J.P. de Figueiredo Jr. & Richard G. Vanden Bergh, The Political Economy of
State-Level Administrative Procedure Acts, 47 J.L. & ECON. 569 (2004) (describing state APAs, the
history of their respective enactments, and the conditions inducing their passage).
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